Contents

Preview to this book xi Part I Representations of constitutions					
	1.1	Motivation and summary	3		
	1.2	Arrow's constitution	3		
	1.3	Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and its implications	4		
	1.4	Gärdenfors's model	5		
	1.5	Notes and comments	6		
2	Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms		7		
	2.1	Motivation and summary	7		
	2.2	Constitutions	8		
	2.3	Constitutions and effectivity functions	12		
	2.4	Game forms and a representation theorem	16		
	2.5	Representation and simultaneous exercising of rights	19		
	2.6	Notes and comments	19		
3	Nash consistent representations				
	3.1	Motivation and summary	21		
	3.2	Existence of Nash consistent representations: a general result	22		
	3.3	The case of finitely many alternatives	24		
	3.4	Nash consistent representations of topological effectivity			
		functions	29		
	3.5	Veto functions	34		
		3.5.1 Finitely many alternatives	34		
		3.5.2 Topological veto functions	36		
	3.6	Liberalism and Pareto optimality of Nash equilibria	40		
	3.7	Notes and comments	42		

vii

viii Contents

4	Acceptable representations		
	4.1	Motivation and summary	45
	4.2	Acceptable representations and minimal liberalism	46
	4.3	Existence of acceptable representations	51
	4.4	A game form with all Nash equilibrium outcomes Pareto	
		optimal	52
	4.5	Proof of Theorem 4.3.1	54
	4.6	Notes and comments	57
5	Str	ongly consistent representations	59
	5.1	Motivation and summary	59
	5.2	Necessary conditions for strongly consistent representations	60
	5.3	Existence of strongly consistent representations	62
	5.4	Strongly consistent representations of topological effectivity	
		functions	64
	5.5	Notes and comments	66
6	Nas	sh consistent representation through lottery models	67
	6.1	Motivation and summary	67
	6.2	Nash consistent representation: an extension	69
	6.3	Lottery models	70
	6.4	Neutral effectivity functions	74
	6.5	Notes and comments	78
7	On	the continuity of representations of constitutions	81
	7.1	Motivation and summary	81
	7.2	Continuous representations may not exist	82
	7.3	Finitely generated effectivity functions and ε -representations .	84
	7.4	The reduction theorem	86
	7.5	Semicontinuous representations on \mathbb{R}	88
	7.6	Representations of effectivity functions and modified Baire	
		functions	92
	7.7	Notes and comments	94
Par	rt II	Consistent voting	
8	Intr	roduction to Part II	97
-	8.1	Motivation and summary	97
	8.2	The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and its implications	98
	8.3	Exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions	99
	8.4	Strategyproofness and restricted preferences	
	8.5	Equilibrium with threats	
	8.6	Notes and comments	

Contents

9	Feas	sible elimination procedures			
	9.1	Motivation and summary			
	9.2	Feasible elimination procedures			
	9.3	Maximal alternatives and effectivity functions			
	9.4	A proof of Theorem 9.3.6			
	9.5	Notes and comments			
10	Exactly and strongly consistent representations of				
	effe	ctivity functions			
	10.1	Motivation and summary			
	10.2	Feasible elimination procedures revisited			
	10.3	Sufficient conditions for elimination stability			
	10.4	Necessary conditions for the existence of ESC representations 117			
	10.5	Necessity of elimination stability for the existence of ESC			
		representations			
	10.6	Notes and comments			
11	Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters 123				
	11.1	Motivation and summary			
	11.2	The basic model			
	11.3	The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem			
	11.4	Exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions 129			
		11.4.1 Effectivity functions of ESC social choice functions 130			
	11.5	Blocking coefficients of anonymous ESC SCFs 131			
	11.6	Feasible elimination procedures			
	11.7	Core and feasible elimination procedures			
		Positive blocking coefficients			
	11.9	Notes and comments			
Ref	eren	ces			
Aut	hor	Index			
Sub	iect	Index			