

Killer Acquisitions in Digital Markets: An Analysis of the EU Merger Control Regime

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vorgelegt von

Giulia Sonderegger
von Heiden AR

genehmigt auf Antrag von
Prof. Dr. Andreas Heinemann
und
Prof. Dr. Peter Georg Picht

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Giulia Sonderegger

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EU Merger Control Regime**

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List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---------|--|
| ACCC | Australian Competition and Consumer Commission |
| ACM | Association for Computing Machinery |
| AG | Advocate General |
| AI | artificial intelligence |
| AR | augmented reality |
| Art. | Article |
| BAT | Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent |
| BBVA | Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria |
| BEIS | UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy |
| BRICS | Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa |
| CEO | Chief Executive Officer |
| CERRE | Centre of Regulation in Europe |
| CRA | Charles River Associates |
| CLES | Centre for Law, Economics and Society |
| CMA | Competition and Market Authority in the UK |
| CNBC | Consumer News and Business Channel |
| CNET | Computer Network |
| Co. | Company |
| COM | Communication |
| Corp. | Corporation |
| CPI | Competition Policy International |
| CRESSE | Competition & Regulation European Summer School and Conference |
| D.D.C. | United States District Court for the District Columbia |
| DCF | Discounted Cash Flow Valuation |
| DG Comp | Directorate-General for Competition |
| DMA | Digital Markets Act |
| DoJ | Department of Justice |
| DVD | Digital Versatile Disks |
| E.U. | European Union |

| | |
|---------|--|
| EEA | European Economic Area |
| EC | European Commission |
| ECA | European Court of Auditors |
| ECJ | European Court of Justice |
| ed. | editor |
| edn. | edition |
| eds. | editors |
| et al. | and others |
| et seq. | and what follows |
| EU | European Union |
| EUMR | European Merger Regulation |
| EY | Ernst and Young |
| fn. | footnote |
| Form CO | Official form for standard notifications |
| Form RS | Official form for reasoned submission pursuant to Art. 4(4) and (5) EUMR |
| FTC | US Federal Trade Commission |
| GAFAM | Google, Amazon, Facebook Apple and Microsoft |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GE | General Electronic Company |
| GRUR | Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheber |
| GWB | Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (German Competition Act) |
| HHI | Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index |
| HM | His Majesty's |
| ibid | in the same source |
| IBM | International Business Machines Corporation |
| ICT | information and communications technology |
| IP | intellectual property |
| IPO | initial public offering |
| Inc. | Incorporation |
| IT | information technology |
| M&A | mergers and acquisitions |

| | |
|----------|---|
| MEI | Merger Enforcement Intensity |
| MIS | Management Information Systems |
| MIT | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| N.D.Cal. | United States District Court for the Northern District of California |
| NBER | National Bureau of National Research |
| NGS | Next-generation sequencing |
| No. | number |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| OFT | Office of Fair Trading |
| OJ | Official Journal |
| para. | paragraph |
| paras. | paragraphs |
| PwC | PricewaterhouseCoopers |
| R&D | Research and development |
| RSC | Robert Schuhman Center |
| SAIL | Stanford Artificial Intelligence Laboratory |
| SEC | United States Securities and Exchange Commission |
| SIEC | Substantial Impediment of Effective Competition |
| SLC | Substantial Lessening of Competition |
| SME | Small and medium-sized company |
| SSNIP | Small but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Price |
| SSNDQ | Small but Significant Non-Transitory Decrease in Quality |
| SSRN | Social Science Research Network |
| SVB | Silicon Valley Bank |
| SWD | Staff Working Document |
| TEU | Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union |
| TFEU | Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| TTBER | Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation |
| U.S. | United States (of America) |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| US | United States (of America) |

VC Venture Capital

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