

Killer Acquisitions in Digital Markets: An Analysis of the EU Merger Control Regime

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vorgelegt von

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von Heiden AR

genehmigt auf Antrag von
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und
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Zürich, den 06.12.2023

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Giulia Sonderegger

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EU Merger Control Regime**

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List of Abbreviations

ACCC	Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
ACM	Association for Computing Machinery
AG	Advocate General
AI	artificial intelligence
AR	augmented reality
Art.	Article
BAT	Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent
BBVA	Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria
BEIS	UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CERRE	Centre of Regulation in Europe
CRA	Charles River Associates
CLES	Centre for Law, Economics and Society
CMA	Competition and Market Authority in the UK
CNBC	Consumer News and Business Channel
CNET	Computer Network
Co.	Company
COM	Communication
Corp.	Corporation
CPI	Competition Policy International
CRESSE	Competition & Regulation European Summer School and Conference
D.D.C.	United States District Court for the District Columbia
DCF	Discounted Cash Flow Valuation
DG Comp	Directorate-General for Competition
DMA	Digital Markets Act
DoJ	Department of Justice
DVD	Digital Versatile Disks
E.U.	European Union

EEA	European Economic Area
EC	European Commission
ECA	European Court of Auditors
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ed.	editor
edn.	edition
eds.	editors
et al.	and others
et seq.	and what follows
EU	European Union
EUMR	European Merger Regulation
EY	Ernst and Young
fn.	footnote
Form CO	Official form for standard notifications
Form RS	Official form for reasoned submission pursuant to Art. 4(4) and (5) EUMR
FTC	US Federal Trade Commission
GAFAM	Google, Amazon, Facebook Apple and Microsoft
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GE	General Electronic Company
GRUR	Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheber
GWB	Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (German Competition Act)
HHI	Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index
HM	His Majesty's
ibid	in the same source
IBM	International Business Machines Corporation
ICT	information and communications technology
IP	intellectual property
IPO	initial public offering
Inc.	Incorporation
IT	information technology
M&A	mergers and acquisitions

MEI	Merger Enforcement Intensity
MIS	Management Information Systems
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
N.D.Cal.	United States District Court for the Northern District of California
NBER	National Bureau of National Research
NGS	Next-generation sequencing
No.	number
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFT	Office of Fair Trading
OJ	Official Journal
para.	paragraph
paras.	paragraphs
PwC	PricewaterhouseCoopers
R&D	Research and development
RSC	Robert Schuhman Center
SAIL	Stanford Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
SEC	United States Securities and Exchange Commission
SIEC	Substantial Impediment of Effective Competition
SLC	Substantial Lessening of Competition
SME	Small and medium-sized company
SSNIP	Small but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Price
SSNDQ	Small but Significant Non-Transitory Decrease in Quality
SSRN	Social Science Research Network
SVB	Silicon Valley Bank
SWD	Staff Working Document
TEU	Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union
TFEU	Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TTBER	Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation
U.S.	United States (of America)
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States (of America)

VC	Venture Capital
v	versus
vs.	versus

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