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Legislation and Exposition

Critical Analysis of Differences between the
Philosophy of Kant and Hegel

HEGEL-STUDIEN

In Verbindung mit der Hegel-Kommission der Rheinisch-
Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften

herausgegeben von
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Beiheft 24

FELIX MEINER VERLAG
HAMBURG

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT AND HEGEL

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Inhaltlich unveränderter Print-on-Demand-Nachdruck der Auflage von 1984,
erschienen im Verlag H. Bouvier und Co., Bonn.

Bibliographische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen
Nationalbibliographie; detaillierte bibliographische Daten sind im Internet über
(<http://portal.dnb.de>) abrufbar.

ISBN 978-3-7873-2913-7

ISBN eBook: 978-3-7873-2923-6

ISSN 0440-5927

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verfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen,
soweit es nicht §§ 53 und 54 URG ausdrücklich gestatten. Gesamtherstellung: BoD,
Norderstedt. Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem Werkdruckpapier, hergestellt aus 100 %
chlorfrei gebleichtem Zellstoff. Printed in Germany. www.meiner.de/hegel-studien

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AUTHOR'S NOTE

The present book, though not unrelated to the author's previous books on KANT and Hegel, aims explicitly to juxtapose the two systems. It refers to some of the major issues common to them but attempts to show the structural difference pertaining to them. It goes without saying that *Legislation* refers to KANT while *Exposition* refers to Hegel. The analysis of the systems leads to a critical evaluation of them. That evaluation is not an external addendum to the analysis; it is meant to emerge out of the analysis as such. In that criticism, with all the due reservation, an attempt is made in the direction of a certain — reserved as it may be — preference for KANT. In this respect the trend of the book is similar to that of the author's *Wege zur Erkennbarkeit*, Freiburg 1983.

I would like to thank here Professor Dr. OTTO PÖGGELER who was kind enough to encourage me to write the book when I first conceived it and agreed to include it in the series of Beihefte to Hegel-Studien.

Jerusalem 1983

NATHAN ROTENSTREICH

„In einer transzendentalen Logik isoliren wir den Verstand ... und heben bloß den Teil des Denkens aus unserem Erkenntnis heraus, der lediglich seinen Ursprung in dem Verstande hat ... Der Teil der transzendentalen Logik also, der die Elemente der reinen Verstandeserkenntnis vorträgt, und die Principien, ohne welche überall kein Gegenstand gedacht werden kann, ist die transcendente Analytik und zugleich eine Logik der Wahrheit.“

Kr. d. r. V. 87

„... was sie [sc. die Logik] ist, kann es sie daher nicht voraussagen, sondern ihre ganze Abhandlung bringt dies Wissen von ihr selbst erst als ihr Letztes und als ihre Vollendung hervor.“

Hegel: Wissenschaft der Logik. Einleitung. 1

„Ich habe dann das Wort *Begriff* gebraucht in einer Bedeutung ... er sey das Gesetz des Werdens; ich kann hier folglich, vielleicht deutlicher sagen, Gesetz der Entwicklung.“

J. H. Erdmann: Vorlesungen über Glauben und Wissen. 1837.258

Chapter One

UNITY AND HIERARCHY

1.

In our attempt to analyse the structures of the KANTian and Hegelian systems, we employ various comparative tools.* Towards this end, we may try to present a resumé of these systems despite all the reservations which have to accompany such an attempt.

KANT established a hierarchical system and was guided in his enterprise by several considerations. He started off with the dichotomy of sensuality and intelligence (although the term does not appear in KANT'S own presentation). Intelligence comprises understanding (*Verstand*) and reason (*Vernunft*). Yet there is a built-in superiority in that duality attributed to intelligence, since its manifestation as understanding, let alone as reason, is endowed with activity. Hence it goes out towards the data given by the sensuality. The

* The book is based on a close interpretation of the texts. Hence the many references and quotations. At the same time the trend of the book is not to be a textual interpretation only but also a critical analysis. In any case, the many quotations carry with them a difficulty and a fault: not so much of misquotations, but of mistakes as to the volumes referred. An effort has been made to avoid that possible fault, but "errare" etc.

The texts referred to have been quoted in the following way: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* is referred to within the sequence of the analysis as B and A editions respectively. The number of the page mentioned after the semi-colon (:) relates to the English translation of NORMAN KEMP SMITH New York/Toronto 1965.

All other books of KANT refer to the edition of the *Akademie*. After the semicolon the reference is made to the English translations (1) *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* by LEWIS WHITE BECK; Indianapolis 1956; (2) *Kritik der Urteilkraft* by JAMES CREED MEREDITH, Oxford 1964; (3) *Prolegomena*, by LEWIS WHITE BECK, Indianapolis 1950.

The number of the page after the semi-colon refers to those editions.

(4) The smaller writings of KANT relevant for several aspects of the exploration are mentioned in their English translation by way of the reference to the collection. On History edited by LEWIS WHITE BECK, Indianapolis 1963. KANT'S other books in their translation are quoted in so far as a translation is available. The specifics of the translations appear in the footnotes. Hegel's works are referred to in the *Freundesvereinsausgabe* or in the critical edition: *Gesammelte Werke*. Hamburg (Meiner).

Philosophie des Rechtes is quoted also in the English translation by T. M. KNOX: *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Oxford. The references to that translation appear after the semi-colon.

As to the present book itself, parts of it previously published have been rewritten.

active aspect is not present on the level of the data in spite of the fact that there are valid pure forms of sensuality and not only forms of understanding. Once the aspect of superiority comes in, either explicitly or not, we discern that understanding is a manifestation or contraction of reason being the highest faculty within the spectrum of elements of knowledge. Reason is the legislative faculty *par excellence*. *Pari passu* we come to the conclusion that there is no knowledge unless there is legislation, that is to say, the constitution of the objects by way of a synthesis between data and forms. Once reason is posited as the top of the hierarchy we are led to an additional aspect, namely, that in consciousness we can discern the highest manifestation of activity as enclosed in consciousness itself. This architectonic consideration leads KANT to the discernment and analysis of the aspect of transcendental apperception and this will be the topic of the first stage of our exploration.

Anticipating the next stage of our analysis we can say that unlike KANT Hegel does not take the hierarchical structure as the model of his system. Hence he interprets reason not as the peak of the hierarchy but as the comprehensive sphere. Because of that basic difference in the architectonics Hegel does not posit the transcendental apperception as the anchor of the system. He presents spirit as its basic theme and focus of convergence of the various manifestations discerned in their presence in the world not as data but as manifestations. This structure will be the second stage of our examination.

2.

Having outlined the broad context of the first step of our analysis the task before us is to deal with KANT'S notion of "I think" and to examine the reasons for establishing the position of that notion and its corresponding noematic position within the structure of the system. We begin with some of KANT'S own statements related to the features of the "I" or of the "I think".

KANT mentions the aspect of one's consciousness of oneself in the context of the contradistinction between the consciousness of the self and the knowledge of the self (58; 169). It can be taken as an established feature in KANT'S eyes that the consciousness of the self is essential for the meaning and the position of the "I". Sometimes KANT is more cautious in pointing to that feature when he says, for instance, that this "I" is as little an intuition as it is a concept of any object. It is the mere form of consciousness (382; 353). Apparently there is an implied identity between consciousness of oneself, which is consciousness and not knowledge proper, and the mere form of consciousness. The self-referring character of the "I", since it is only self-referential as a form, is "the poorest of all representations" (408; 369). In spite of that statement KANT makes a step in the direction of a further description of

the position and meaning of the “I” when he says that because the “I” is conscious of itself the “I” is identical with itself. The self-referential character connotes here the self-identity which is, after all, a statement about a kind of a constant character implied in the notion of the “I”. One could suggest that this step from self-consciousness, or the position of the form, to the awareness of self-identity becomes explicit in the identification of the “I” with the thinking subject. KANT says, for instance: “The consciousness of myself in the representation ‘I’ is not an intuition, but a merely *intellectual* representation of the spontaneity (*Selbsttätigkeit*) of a thinking subject” (279; 247).

Analysing this statement we arrive at the following four points: a) The consciousness of the consciousness of myself employs the juxtaposition of intuition and intellectual representation; or putting it differently, it employs the fundamental awareness of the difference between intuition and the intellectual or *mere* intellectual meaning of the position of myself. b) This implies that the interpretation of the form or mere form is identical with the component or meaning of being intellectual. c) Such a position is interpreted as amounting to self-activity. Already at this point we may pose the question what is the more precise meaning of the self involved in the activity: Is it the self referring to himself or reflecting about himself, or is it the self whose activity finds manifestations beyond himself, as say in the direction of the data. d) The self is presented as a thinking subject or sometimes as a logical unity of the subject.

What leads KANT to that consummating statement in which the activity of thinking or self-reflection is presented as subject? Perhaps the very notion of subject implies a kind of permanence or constancy which may lead in the direction of a substratum. This is so in spite of the fact that elsewhere KANT says explicitly that beyond the logical meaning of the “I” we have no knowledge of the subject in itself “which as substratum underlies the ‘I’, as it does all thoughts” (350; 334). The distinction between the position of subject and the position of substratum is relevant because KANT wants to maintain the view that there is no line of continuity leading from subject to soul. Still KANT himself uses the term “the subject” which, with all the attempts of presenting a line of demarcation between it and the substratum — let alone the substance — still connotes not only a self-activity but a rounded position of that activity as well as a kind of a basic stratum (*substratum*) of that activity.

Furthermore, in the same context, KANT asserts that consciousness accompanies all concepts (404; 331) in that the “I” is the one condition which accompanies all thought (398; 362). In spite of the fact that the “I” or the self is void of any representations or any concepts, self-awareness is the condition of any concept and representation. And what’s more: “It is known

only through the thoughts which are its predicates, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any concept whatsoever, but can only revolve in a perpetual circle, since any judgement upon it has always already made use of its representation" (404; 331). One can assume that thoughts are described here as predicates, because of the connotation of the "I" as the subject, with all that goes along with that connotation. Yet, though we realize the circularity of the various statements, this does not prevent KANT from positing the "I" as a condition or even a super-condition of all our concepts, thoughts and representations. In this sense, a particular position is attributed to the "I"; its involvement in the circularity does not prevent the separation of the "I". In traditional philosophical terms or pointing to the philosophical development after KANT, one could say that the "I" is always and essentially a condition and cannot be, in any sense, of a conditioned position. Here we must ask wherefrom does the "I" know of that position or, put differently, whether self-awareness which is the essential feature of the "I" implies the awareness of being un-conditioned. To be sure, this question is critical for the entire structure of the system.

3.

Some supplementary aspects of the "I" come to the fore when we look into a cognate topic in KANT'S presentation, namely the concept of apperception. "Self-consciousness is therefore the representation of that which is the condition of all unity, and itself is unconditioned". Preceding that statement KANT says "Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the categories, which on their part represent nothing but the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, insofar as the manifold has unity in apperception" (401; 365). There is a correlation between self-consciousness in its unconditioned position and the concepts, since one's self-consciousness is the condition of all unity. Yet we face also the correlation of self-consciousness qua apperception and the manifold, whereby the manifold is immediately understood as the manifold of intuition. As such it cannot stand alone or be self-enclosed. It points to its correlate which, by the same token, is not only a correlate on the equal level with the manifold but also implies the superior position of condition qua unity and self-awareness. Self-awareness is not only in this sense, as the verbal meaning would imply, the awareness of the self of himself. It is also the awareness of the correlate in terms of the manifold and in terms of the dependence of that manifold on the apperception. At this point one could ask the question related to KANT'S contradistinction between self-awareness and knowledge: the self knowing himself knows also his position as a condition as well as the position of the manifold as a correlate of the condition. The self refers to the manifold and refers to himself by bringing the manifold within the scope of self-awareness. This is

a significant point from the systematic perspective, because as long as KANT insisted on the distinction between thinking and knowing he could take thinking as self-consciousness as an analytic unity. But in terms of apperception (as presented before in KANT'S own language) we are bound to refer to a synthetic unity of the apperception. This is what KANT calls, in paragraph 16 of *The Critique* "the original synthetic unity of apperception". When we look into the wording of the paragraph we realize that it might be rather difficult to maintain the suggested distinction between an analytic and a synthetic unity whereby the analytic would refer to self-consciousness as such, while the synthetic would refer to the manifold which appears within the horizon of the apperception. KANT says: "It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me . . . All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to that 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found . . . I call it *pure apperception* to distinguish it from empirical apperception, or, again, *original apperception*, because it is that self-consciousness which, by generating the representation 'I think' (a representation which must be capable of accompanying all other representations and which in all consciousness is one and the same) cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation. The unity of this apperception I likewise entitle the *transcendental* unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of a *a priori* knowledge arising from it." (131-132; 152-153).

This sounds very problematic, given the position of the "I" or of the identity of apperception. We take up the task of analysing this statement.

4.

First of all, we encounter in KANT'S presentation a certain ambiguity in relation to the identity of the "I" which is, and this goes without saying, self-identity. In one context the identity is one of reflection: the "I" reflects upon his concepts and that very reflection, which again is an activity and not a status, amounts to the position of the "I". In a second context we encounter not only reflection but what might be described as the intentionality of the "I" to data and, by the same token, to the categories unifying those data. KANT distinguishes between different modes of the identity of apperception. He speaks, for instance, about the synthetic unity and says the following: "Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as generated *a priori*, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes *a priori* all my determinate thought . . . Understanding alone . . . is nothing but the faculty of combining *a priori*, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception. The principle of apperception is the highest

principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge" (134-135; 154). Cognate to that statements is the well-known one: "For where the understanding has not previously combined, it cannot be dissolved, since only as having been combined *by the understanding* can anything that allows for analysis be given to the faculty of representation. But the concept of combination includes, besides the concept of the manifold and of its synthesis, also the concept of the unity of the manifold" (130; 152). The distinction between the analytic and the synthetic unity is not made clear by KANT's footnote, which reads as follows: "The analytic unity of consciousness belongs to all general concepts, as such. If, for instance, I think red in general, I thereby represent to myself a property which . . . can be found in something or can be combined with other representation; that is, only by means of a presupposed synthetic unity can I represent to myself the analytic unity. A representation which is to be thought as common to *different* representations is regarded as belonging to such as have, in addition to it, also something *different*. Consequently, it must previously be thought in synthetic unity with other . . . representations, before I can think in it the analytic unity of consciousness, which makes it a *conceptus communis*. The synthetic unity of apperception is therefore the highest point, to which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy. Indeed this faculty of apperception is the understanding itself." (134-135; 154, footnote). Yet elsewhere, KANT says that "all the variety of *empirical consciousness* must be combined in one single self-consciousness, is *absolutely* first and synthetic principle of our thought in general." (117; 142)

Here we are brought to the realization that KANT employs the expression "synthetic unity" as connoting the combination of different representations in one representation or the combination of different concepts in one concept; that unity, which is a constructed or created unity by the positing consciousness, is prior to the analytic unity which appears as a summary of the steps taken in bringing about, through synthesis, the unity. The product of that synthesis is the common concept which is identified as an analytic unity of consciousness connoting, in the context, the separation of the common features from the acts of comparison and bringing them together — which preceded the consummation in the common concept. Yet, on the other hand, the "I" who represents to himself a property, seems to be the phenomenological feature of the representations in general, whether synthetic in KANT's sense or analytic, that the "I" attributes to himself as a property the theme or the *noema*, disregarding the particular steps he is taking vis-à-vis the *noemata*, that is to say whether he constructs them or just grasps them. Further still, the distinction between the synthetic and analytic is introduced here into the discussion in terms of the representations. But at

the same time KANT deals with that distinction in terms of the very position of the apperception or the original apperception. He refers to the dependence of empirical consciousness on one single self-consciousness which in turn, because of that dependence, is attributed the position of the absolutely first and synthetic principle of our thought in general.

To put it more simply, KANT uses the distinction between analytic and synthetic in terms of the representations and concepts. Because a construction is involved in the very combination of representations — that construction is designated as a synthesis. Yet at the same time he uses the terms “synthetic” or “synthesis” in the sense of attributing representations or concepts to the self-consciousness, and thus establishing the belonging of the representations or concepts to the consciousness by positing them within the horizon of the self-consciousness. The distinction between synthetic and analytic in the first sense relates to the context of the representations and the concepts themselves, while in the second sense it relates to the presence of the representations and the concepts within thought and its inherence in consciousness.

Here we return to our previous comment as to the two directions of the notion of self-consciousness or apperception: consciousness goes out, as it were, to grasp representations and from the angle of this direction of it it does not matter whether the act of grasping or awareness refers to single representations, or whether it compares them or constructs a common representation. Yet, concurrently with that act of “going out” of consciousness the “coming back” of it, as it were, emerges. The coming back is brought about by the very awareness of the representations accompanied by self-awareness or self-consciousness. Hence, the synthetic dimension of consciousness is present in both directions. Only because of that doubleway presentness could KANT speak at all of one single self-consciousness and its absolute position.

We are bound to ask ourselves whether these variations on the analytic and synthetic component in self-consciousness coalesce with the previous distinction between the reflective character of self-consciousness and its intentional character. We are bound to ask that question because the component of intentionality in consciousness is present in it, by definition, in terms of its reference to representations. It is not clear whether the reflecting component of consciousness accompanies intentionality or is emerging out of the direction of attributing representations made aware in intentionality to self-consciousness. The second possibility is precluded because it would be impossible to assume the attribution to self-consciousness, were not self-consciousness present to itself in the first place. Only in this sense can self-consciousness be regarded as an absolute condition. If this is so then we find in KANT — and it is not essential here to dwell on the question whether or not

he was aware of that — a kind of two directions of synthesis, one inherent in intentionality in its two directions, namely to the representation and towards attribution and one inherent in the reflection itself. How these two directions of synthesis relate to one another KANT does not make clear.

We may pose a systematic question whether one of these directions underlies them both and if so what kind of priority has to be considered here: chronological or structural. We could say that chronologically, in terms of the development of the cognitive faculty, intentionality preceded reflection. The self becomes aware of itself only by thinking thoughts. Thus thinking about thinking accompanies that structure with the awareness that it thinks about different thoughts — but it still *thinks*. Thus it discerns in its thinking the aspect of the dimensions of self-consciousness as connoting the breadth of thinking (since different thoughts can be entertained by thinking) and the depth of thinking (since thinking as such is both related to different thoughts and is independent not only of each one of them but also of all of them).

5.

There are some additional nuances in KANT'S presentation. He introduces the position of the unity of consciousness via the notion of the unity of rule. He says that this unity determines all manifold. The concept of this unity is the representation of the object (105; 135). This statement is meant to convey the notion that all knowledge demands a concept; a concept as such is a unity, or if we put it in a dynamic form, is a unifying notion or principle. When we speak e. g. about the concept of body we imply the unity of a manifold. That unity is brought about by our thinking or by our thought which amounts to a rule in our knowledge, since the unity is apparently not an accidental one but has a structure and for the presence of that structure we can put forward a justification. Again, KANT says that a rule is a rule because it brings together in a necessary way the ingredients of the manifold.

We come across that which we designated before as the non-accidental character of the unity. For instance — in the concept of the body there is a relation between the representation of extension, impenetrability, shape; one representation leads necessarily to another. In the concept or in the thought we unify these different components; the very notion of the necessary connection connotes that prescribed unification.


At this point KANT says again that the necessary reproduction of the manifold is related to the synthetic unity in our consciousness of the given appearances of which the manifold is composed. He sums up this description by saying: "All necessity, without exception, is grounded in a transcendental condition. There must, therefore be a transcendental ground of the

unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold in all our intuitions, and consequently also of the concepts of objects in general ... A ground without which it would be impossible to think any object for our intuitions ... This original and transcendental condition is no other than *transcendental apperception*" (106-107; 135-136). When we look into this statement and examine the introduction of the notion of unity and transcendental apperception, we realize that KANT presents here not the act of representation as such, neither the act of attribution of representation. He presents the awareness of the necessity which is inherent in the notion of unity in the transcendental sense of that term. We have to look, therefore, to some of the aspects of the notion of "transcendental" in order to see whether and how it relates to the different shades of the unity of the apperception to which we referred before.

6.

Several descriptions of the concept of "transcendental" or "transcendentality" call for an analysis in the present context. KANT says that the dissection of the faculty of understanding itself, in order to investigate the possibility of concepts *a priori* by looking for them in the understanding alone, is the proper task of a transcendental philosophy (90; 103). The question which has to be explored here is the following: whether the understanding alone, which is the birth-place, in KANT's metaphoric expression, of the concepts, is to be understood in the sense of being accompanied by self-awareness, or whether we are concerned with concepts *a priori* whose characteristic feature is not only their grounding in understanding but also their *a priori* applicability to data which are given to understanding and are not stemming from it. Again, KANT says about transcendental philosophy that it treats only of the understanding and of reason in a system of concepts and principles which relate to objects in general (873; 662). The emphasis is placed on the relation or intentionality to objects in general — and there is no mentioning of the reflective character of understanding or of reasoning. This presentation is reinforced by a statement that although the highest principles and fundamental concepts of morality are *a priori* or are belonging to *a priori* knowledge they have no place in transcendental philosophy. Transcendental philosophy in this sense is a philosophy of pure and merely speculative reasoning.

We can add that knowledge as such relates to data and this character cannot be transplanted to the area of moral philosophy since moral philosophy as such does not refer to data. Empirical concepts, as KANT says, must necessarily be brought into the concept of duty. But when this is the case and the empirical concepts appear within the horizon of moral philosophy they re-



present either a hindrance which by the way of the moral imperatives we have to overcome, or they represent an allurements which, again in terms of the moral philosophy, we must make into a motive. Hence we have to translate that allurements into the incentive of pure or practical reasoning (29; 61). Within transcendental philosophy proper there is always present the pull of data to which the concepts have to be applied. In that sphere there is a built-in duality, while within practical reasoning there is a self-contained structure of reason alone. We shall come back to the practical aspect when we deal with freedom and ask there the question about the presence or lack of self-consciousness in the context of freedom. What is already clear is that the aspect of transcendentalism as such is unequivocally related to the dimension of intentionality. Consequently, it does not carry in itself, or with itself, the aspect of self-consciousness.

To what extent the concept of transcendentalism describes a particular area of cognitive concern can be observed in an additional statement of KANT'S when speaking about transcendental philosophy as being unique in the whole field of speculative knowledge. The characteristic feature of that aspect of transcendentalism is " . . . that no question which concerns an object given to pure reason can be insoluble for this same reason . . . That very concept which puts us in a position to ask the question must also qualify us to answer it . . . the only question to which we have the right to demand a sufficient answer bearing on the constitution of the object" (505-506; 431). In this statement we find a formulation of the correlation pertaining between the position of the question and the position of the answer. Our concern is with the constitution of the object and is related to the fact that the object must be given empirically. These are specifications of the correlation between the concept and the datum and are stated from the point of view of transcendentalism. We move here within the sphere prescribed by the correlation of the two. Self-consciousness, if it would be brought into that structure, would amount to a kind of looking from above which, as such, would be on the one hand a position of an observer above the transcendental concept and, on the other hand the empirical data or objects. To put it differently, self-consciousness would amount to an additional dimension which would bring a horizontal aspect to the structure in addition to the vertical relation pertaining between concepts and data. KANT did not suggest a transition or a deduction from self-consciousness to the plurality of transcendental concepts and their functional position within the structure of knowledge.

To be sure, transcendental concepts and the structure of correlation are grounded in the very distinction between intuitions and concepts. In this sense, KANT says that all intuitions as sensuous (*sinnlich*) rest on affections while concepts rest on functions (93; 105). It is appropriate at this point to

look into the description of the meaning of the term “function” as well as of the “birthplace” — to come back to that metaphor describing the functions. The relevant statement reads as follows: “By ‘function’ I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation. Concepts are based on the spontaneity of thought, sensible intuitions on the receptivity of impression” (93; 105). Function, in this sense, is the act of constructing a common representation and not, or not only, the explicit form of that construction, for instance the category of causality or substance. Because of the emphasis placed on the functional or active character of the unity — we could say of the unification — KANT speaks *immediately* about concepts based on the spontaneity of thought. In this context, spontaneity would connote not only the power of producing representation from itself but also the self-activity or the ongoing activity. To put it differently, spontaneity would mean not only the independence of the function but also the creativity implied in the active character of the function as against the product of it or the construct. Again, though KANT refers here to that aspect of spontaneity, connoting functions of unity or unification, he does not point to a possible concomitant of these functions in terms of self-consciousness, though one could perhaps expect that shift given the sphere in which the whole presentation is formulated.

Hence the question arises: why did not KANT make that step from spontaneity to self-consciousness, in spite of the affinity which no doubt is present in his system? The answer seems to lie in what has been presented at the beginning of this part of our analysis, namely that the structure of correlation did not lead KANT to the isolation of the full scope of spontaneity which would include also the reflective character of spontaneity qua consciousness. This implicit and explicit distinction between the intentional and reflective aspect would eventually point to a basic structural fact that KANT did not suggest a deduction of the functional concepts from spontaneity as such. In other words, KANT presents a metaphysical deduction of the categorial forms from forms of judgement or propositions but not from spontaneity as such. KANT assumed that a kind of a mediator between spontaneity *per se* and spontaneity of functions in their plurality is needed. This is so since there is no transition from the reflective self-consciousness as the very essence of it to the plurality of forms, in spite of the fact that the functions qua forms are manifestations of spontaneity. This aspect of the system is prominent in KANT’S notion of the categories. We turn now to this central issue in the system in order to draw additional conclusions as to the different levels present in KANT’S architectonics and also in order to draw additional systematic consequences which will go beyond KANT’S presentation in its wording and possibly in its implications.