

Ernst Cassirer

Nachgelassene Manuskripte
und Texte

Band 15

Vorlesungen und Vorträge zu Kant



Meiner

ERNST CASSIRER

NACHGELASSENE MANUSKRIPTE UND TEXTE

Begründet von

Klaus Christian Köhnke

John Michael Krois und

Oswald Schwemmer

Herausgegeben von

Christian Möckel

Band 15

FELIX MEINER VERLAG
HAMBURG

ERNST CASSIRER

VORLESUNGEN UND VORTRÄGE
ZU KANT

Herausgegeben von
Christian Möckel

FELIX MEINER VERLAG
HAMBURG

Bibliographische Information der Deutschen Bibliothek

Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliographie; detaillierte bibliographische Daten sind im Internet über <<http://portal.dnb.de>> abrufbar.

ISBN 978-3-7873-1261-0

Zitiervorschlag: ECN 15

© Felix Meiner Verlag GmbH, Hamburg 2016. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Dies betrifft auch die Vervielfältigung und Übertragung einzelner Textabschnitte durch alle Verfahren wie Speicherung und Übertragung auf Papier, Transparente, Filme, Bänder, Platten und andere Medien, soweit es nicht §§ 53 und 54 URG ausdrücklich gestatten. – Satz: post scriptum, www.post-scriptum.biz. Druck und Bindung: Beltz, Bad Langensalza. Einbandgestaltung: Jens Peter Mardersteig. Werkdruckpapier: alterungsbeständig nach ANSI-Norm resp. DIN-ISO 9706, hergestellt aus 100 % chlorfrei gebleichtem Zellstoff. www.meiner.de

INHALT

Vorwort des Herausgebers	VII
--------------------------------	-----

VORLESUNGEN UND VORTRÄGE ZU KANT

Kant's Moral Theory	3
The Fundamental Principles of Kantian Philosophy	159
Introduction to Kant's Critical Philosophy	187
The Philosophy of Kant	268
Kant's Theory of Causality	323

BEILAGEN

[Dankesrede]	339
Some Remarks on Kant's Philosophy of History	343

ANHANG

Zur Textgestaltung

1. Zeichen, Siglen, Abkürzungen	355
2. Regeln der Textgestaltung	356

Editorische Hinweise

1. Ziel und Gestalt der Ausgabe	359
2. Zu Überlieferungsgeschichte und Inhalt dieses Bandes	359
3. Für die Bearbeitung dieses Bandes herangezogene Manuskripte	359
4. Zur Entstehung der Textzeugen	374
5. Zusammenhang mit anderen Nachlaßtexten	389
Anmerkungen des Herausgebers	393
Literaturverzeichnis	475
Personenregister	483

VORWORT DES HERAUSGEBERS

Der vorliegende Band ist Ernst Cassirers nachgelassenen Vorlesungs- und Vortragstexten zu Kant gewidmet. Er präsentiert aus der Oxforder Zeit (1933–1935) sowohl die Skripte der Vorlesungen zur Moralphilosophie Kants (1934) und zur Einführung in Kants kritische Philosophie (1935), gehalten jeweils über ein Trimester am All Souls College, als auch den öffentlichen Vortrag über die Grundsätze der Kantischen Philosophie (Februar 1934), gehalten an der University of Reading. Ergänzt werden diese Texte durch eine Dankesrede, vorgetragen im Herbst 1933 am All Souls College, abgedruckt als Beilage. Aus der Yaler Zeit Cassirers (1941–1944) werden die Manuskripte einer Vorlesung über Kants Philosophie (1941) und eines Seminarvortrages über Kants Kausalitätstheorie (1943/44) präsentiert, ergänzt durch einen Seminarvortrag über Kants Geschichtsphilosophie (1941/42).

Bei den Recherchen und Editionsarbeiten hat der Herausgeber umfangreiche Hilfe und Unterstützung erfahren. Besonderer Dank gilt der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, die die mehrjährige Forschungs- und Editionsarbeit zur Herstellung des Manuskriptes großzügig finanziell gefördert hat. Für die institutionelle Unterstützung dieser Ausgabe bin ich der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin zu Dank verpflichtet. Unverzichtbare Hilfe habe ich bei dem Editionsvorhaben von den Mitarbeitern der Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library der Yale University, New Haven (USA), insbesondere durch Moira A. Fitzgerald, Interim Head, Access Services, erfahren. Oswald Schwemmer (Berlin) danke ich für die kollegiale Leitung und beständige Beförderung des Drittmittelprojektes ECN 15. Mayely Sabina Imhoff Torres (Berlin) war mir als studentische Hilfskraft eine unverzichtbare Mitarbeiterin bei der Transkription der englischsprachigen Texte und dem Korrekturlesen der transkribierten Fassung. Martin Klaus Günther (Berlin) hat mich während eines studentischen Praktikums und als studentische Hilfskraft nicht nur tatkräftig beim Korrekturlesen der Transkriptionen und der Fahnenabzüge, sondern auch bei den für den vorliegenden Band notwendigen umfangreichen Literaturrecherchen unterstützt. Ihm gebührt mein besonderer Dank. Herzlich danke ich Hannelore Krois, die mir großzügig Immanuel Kants Werke für die Editionsarbeiten zur Verfügung gestellt hat. Für wertvolle Hinweise und Hilfen dankt der Herausgeber außerdem Jörn Bohr (Wuppertal), Volker Gerhardt (Berlin), Paul Markus (Berlin) und Rasmus Kjelsrud (Berlin).

Christian Möckel

VORLESUNGEN UND VORTRÄGE ZU KANT

KANT'S MORAL THEORY^A₁
[All Souls College Oxford, Hilary Term 1934]

[I]

[The form and method of Kantian Ethics]

[1. Introduction: The logical form of Kant's
moral philosophy]

[1st Lecture, 15/I/1934]

An exposition^B and examination of Kant's^C moral philosophy apart from the totality of the critical system seems to be a doubtful and precarious enterprise. For in a^D philosophical system which really deserves this name^E we are not allowed to make such an artificial separation and such

^A KANT'S MORAL THEORY] *Ms. trägt keinen Titel, siehe dazu Hrsg.-Anm. 1*

^B An exposition] *davor Ms.-S. 1/2 komplett gestrichen*: An exposition and [gestrichen: a critical analysis] examination of Kant's moral philosophy apart from the [gestrichen: whole other parties] totality of the critical system seems to be a doubtful and precarious enterprise [gestrichen: which may be liable to very serious objections][.] For [gestrichen: according to the fundamental principles of critical philosophy] such a [gestrichen: separation and] separation and detachment of single parts [gestrichen: out of the; from the whole of its system and the critical system of critical philosophy] seems to offend against the very principles [gestrichen: of the critical; this system itself] of critical philosophy [gestrichen: itself] itself. If in this philosophy there is any constant and universal definition of the faculty of Reason it consists in the assertion that Reason is to be regarded as an absolute Whole which cannot but in a merely arbitrary way dissolved and dissected in single parts. In all his philosophical work Kant lays the greatest stress upon that which is called by him the articulation and organization of the system[.]. [Siehe dazu Hrsg.-Anm. 3] [gestrichen: Without a] He emphasizes that without a clear survey of this articulation we are not able to judge of the truth and solidity of a philosophical work. Supposing therefore, that the work of Kant has in itself a real organic unity and supposing [über der Zeile: to be true] that definition of the organism, which has been given by Aristotle and accepted and confirmed by Kant: that is, [.] that the parts of an organism, as regards their existence and their form, are only possible through their reference to the whole[.]. (K[ritik] d[er] U[rteils-kraft] §65) [Dazu Hrsg.-Anm. 2] / By the fact of this articulation and organization of reason we are forbidden to take out of it any [gestrichen: separate] isolated parts and to treat them as if they could stand for themselves and explain themselves. According to [gestrichen: a] that definition *Ende der Streichung*

^C Kant's] Kants; *wird künftig stillschweigend korrigiert*

^D a] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: every

^E name] *danach gestrichen*: there

an arbitrary detachment of single parts. An isolation of that sort seems to offend^A the very principles of critical philosophy. If in this philosophy there is any constant and universal definition of the faculty of Reason[,], it consists in the assertion that Reason is to be regarded as an absolute Whole which cannot be divided and dissected^B, in^C a mere mechanical way, into^D separate^E parts. In all his philosophical work[,], Kant lays the greatest stress upon what is called by him ›the articulation and organization of the system.‹³ He emphasizes that without a clear survey of this articulation[,], we are not able to judge the truth^F and solidity of a philosophical work. As a^G consequence of this organization[,], we are forbidden to take out of this work any isolated parts and to treat them as if they could stand by^H themselves and explain and prove themselves. For the nature of an organism^I – according to a definition given by Aristotle and accepted and confirmed by Kant – consists in the fact^J that its^K parts[,], in regards to^L their existence and their form[,], are only possible through their reference to the whole. Thus, in the strict sense, there can be no investigation and no critical analysis of the problems of moral philosophy without a constant reference to the problems of theoretical philosophy. A separate treatment and judgement of Kant's moral doctrines may be admitted for the purposes of a popular explanation and description, but such a popularity cannot lay^M claim to any really scientific and systematic value.

^NHence[,], from the very beginning of our investigation of the moral philosophy of Kant[,], we have to face a difficult methodical problem. Undoubtedly[,], this philosophy has a specific and a very characteristic purport, but the mere description of this purport cannot give us any satisfactory insight into^O what it really^P means and for^Q what it is ultimately

^A offend| offend against

^B dissected| *korrigiert in Bleistift aus*: dissected

^C in| *danach gestrichen*: quite

^D into| in

^E separate| *in Bleistift unter der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: single

^F the truth| of the truth

^G As a| In

^H by| for

^I organism| *danach gestrichen*: consists

^J fact| fact,

^K its| his

^L in regards to| as regards

^M lay| *in Bleistift über der Zeile*

^N Hence| *davor Absatzmarkierung //*

^O into| *in Bleistift korrigiert von fremder Hand aus*: in

^P really| *evtl. besser*: real

^Q for| *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: to

destined. The purport of Kant's ethical doctrines is not only exposed in a certain logical form, but it is bound to and dependent on this form. Logic and Ethics, theoretical and practical philosophy[,] are[,] in the thought of Kant[,] correlated and interdependent members[,] which[,] by this very correlation[,] constitute^A the organic unity of the system. Without the reference to theoretical philosophy[,] moral philosophy would lose^B its foundation;^C without the reference to moral philosophy[,] theoretical philosophy would lose^D its ideal perfection[,] and its ultimate end. Neither^E of them can[,] therefore[,] be fully conceived and fully appreciated by themselves^F; each^G is in want of the other as^H its complement and its systematical counterpart. In all our investigation of the fundamental concepts and the fundamental principles of Kant's moral philosophy, we shall^I, therefore, never be concerned with the problems of Ethics alone. Our principal end in view must rather consist in elucidating theoretical and practical philosophy in light of^J each other, in reducing every concept of Kant's moral philosophy to its theoretical source and in considering not only its contents but also its function, meaning^K the characteristic and necessary task it has to fulfill in the constitution and architecture of the system. The necessity of proceeding in both directions and continuously dealing with problems of [a] different kind and origin seems to make it a hopeless^L attempt^M to treat the questions of Kant's moral philosophy in any satisfactory way in^N the course of these few lectures. But we may consider that, after all, the enlargement of our subject, arising from^O the constant referring^P of ethical problems to theoretical and epistemological problems, implies, on the other hand, a restriction and concentration of our subject. Kant's moral philosophy is rich in special problems important in themselves and important from the point of view

^A constitute| are constituting

^B lose| *in Bleistift korrigiert von fremder Hand aus*: loose

^C foundation;| foundation,

^D lose| *korrigiert über der Zeile, eingeklammert, von fremder Hand aus*: loose

^E Neither| None

^F themselves| itself

^G each| either of them

^H as| as of

^I shall| *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: will

^J in light of| by

^K meaning| that means

^L a hopeless| *über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: an; a *in Bleistift*

^M attempt| *danach gestrichen*: past hope

^N in| *evtl. besser*: over

^O arising from| *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: due to

^P referring| *in Bleistift korrigiert durch Überschreiben aus*: reference

of the History of Ethics. But all these problems[,] being the consequences and applications of the universal principles of Kant's philosophy to concrete questions of moral life, may be and must be set aside as long^A as we are^B concerned with the nature and validity of the principles themselves. We may[,] therefore[,] renounce^C the treatment of all the details of Kant's moral philosophy in order to be able to attain and explain that concept of it which is called[,] by Kant[,] its cosmical concept.

In^D the chapter about the Architectonic of pure reason[,] Kant makes a striking and characteristic difference between the cosmical concept and the mere scholastic concept of Philosophy. ›If we are to understand by philosophy[^E] – he says – [^E]the archetype for the estimation of all attempts at philosophizing, and if this archetype is to serve for the estimation of each subjective philosophy, the structure of which is often so diverse and liable to alteration, it must be taken objectively. Thus regarded, philosophy is a mere idea of a possible science, which nowhere exists in concreto, but to which by many different paths we endeavour to approximate until the one true path, overgrown by the^F products of sensibility has at last been discovered and the image, hitherto so abortive has achieved likeness to the archetype so far as this is granted to [mortal] man. Till then we cannot learn philosophy; for where is it and who is in possession of it, and how shall we recognize it? We can only learn to philosophize, that is, to exercise the talent of reason, in accordance with its universal principles, on certain actually existing attempts at philosophy, always, however, reserving the right of reason to investigate to confirm, or to reject these principles in their very sources.

Hitherto the concept of philosophy has been a merely scholastic concept – a concept of a system of knowledge which is sought solely in its character as a science and which has therefore in view only the systematic unity appropriate to science, and consequently no more than the logical perfection of knowledge. But there is likewise another concept of philosophy, a conceptus cosmicus, which has always formed the real basis of the term ›philosophy‹, especially when it has been, as it were, personified and its archetype represented in the ideal philosopher. In this sense philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of^F

^A long] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: far

^B are] *danach bei Seitenwechsel nicht fortgesetzt*: con-

^C renounce] *danach gestrichen*: to

^D In] *davor Absatzmarkierung in Bleistift im Fließtext*: //

^E the] *danach gestrichen*: products

^F of] *Ms.-S. 11 (Bl. 7) nur mit 6 1/2 Zeilen beschrieben, Abbruch in Zeilenmitte nach: of; Fortsetzung des Fließtextes auf Ms.-S 12 (Bl. 8)*

human reason (teleologia rationis humanae) and the philosopher^A stands before us, not as an artist of reason, but as the lawgiver of human reason. In that sense it would be very boastful to call oneself a philosopher, and to pretend to have equalled the type which exists in the idea only.⁴

But although Kant[, according to^B that discretion^C and critical moderation^D which is an essential feature of his character and his mind[, declined for himself the name of a philosopher in this ideal and all-comprehensive sense, we may be inclined to think that, if anyone^E, he surely was entitled to claim this name. For since the classical age of Philosophy, since the days of Plato, there has never been a thinker in whom the principal elements of philosophical thought were combined in such a happy way as with Kant. The character of his doctrine and^F its superiority rests on the perfect equipoise and harmonious concordance of the logical and moral powers which have cooperated in the foundation and development of his system. He insists throughout upon the logical clearness and soundness of the concepts and principles to be used in philosophy; he refuses to employ any concept or to admit any principle without having submitted it to a critical test by which its value and logical justification has become evident[.] In this connection[, Kant quotes the famous words of Newton ›Hypotheses non fingo^G[, and he attempts to give to these words a wider sense and a stricter significance. They are^G, in his opinion, not confined to the boundaries of natural philosophy but are^H to be applied to the system of philosophy in its most universal sense[.] As Kant declares^I in the chapter about the discipline of pure reason in transscendental philosophy^J, no judgments are allowed which are only founded upon opinions and which, therefore, have but a^K subjective certainty. ›Reason, when employed apart from all experience, can know propositions entirely a priori and as necessary, or it can know nothing at all. Its judgments^L therefore are never opinions, either it must abstain from all judgment, or must affirm with apodictic certainty. Opinions

^A philosopher] *danach gestrichen*: is not

^B according to] *unter der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: himself in

^C discretion] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: human

^D moderation] *unter der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: modesty

^E anyone] anyone else

^F and] *danach gestrichen in Bleistift*: one; *in Tinte*: of

^G They are] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: He is

^H are] *statt gestrichenem*: is

^I declares] *statt gestrichenem*: asserts

^J in transscendental philosophy] *über der Zeile*

^K a] an

^L judgments] *evtl.*: judgements

and probable judgments ... are concerned only with the series of the objects of experience. Outside this field to form opinions is merely to play with thoughts.[⋄] Kant forbids^A philosophical reason such an arbitrary play. In the preface of the ›Critique of pure reason‹ he praises the system of Christian Wolff[,], which he is going to criticise most severely in its philosophical contents, for its logical accuracy and scrupulousness. It is, as he says, due to the method^B of Wolff that the spirit of thoroughness is not yet extinct in German philosophy; he^C was the first to show by example how^D [–] in philosophy [–] the sure progress of a science is to be attained only through orderly establishment of principles, clear determination of concepts, insistence upon strictness of proofs and avoidance of^E venture-some steps in our inferences. This logical and methodological^F point of view is not given up or denied by Kant in his transition from the theoretical^G field of knowledge to the practical field. In this domain he likewise insists upon the clear definition of fundamental concepts and upon the strictness of demonstration and inference. A philosopher, and especially a critical philosopher, is not expected to preach morals; he is required^H and obliged to teach morality, that is[,], to define its sense and to found it upon firm and steadfast principles. But although not deviating from this straight and narrow path of reason, from the way of logical deduction and analysis, Kant is perfectly conscious of the fact^I that Morality in itself cannot be exhausted and cannot be fully determined by this method alone. Its significance and its deepest source are^J not to be found in the circuit of merely theoretical investigation.^K Moral consciousness may and must be defined by Science, but it is not confined to Science. In explaining it and in searching for its origin[,], we have^L to extend the very concept of Philosophy itself; we have to change the scholastic aspect of Philosophy into its cosmic^M aspect. It is not before we have attained^N

^A forbids] forbids to

^B method] *danach gestrichen*: and example

^C he] for he

^D how] *danach gestrichen*: the secure

^E of] *danach gestrichen*: all

^F methodological] *über der Zeile zu* methodical *hinzugefügt*: olog

^G theoretical] *statt gestrichenem*: practi[cal]

^H required] *in Bleistift statt gestrichenem*: demanded

^I fact] fact,

^J are] is

^K investigation.] *danach gestrichen*: and theoretical knowledge.

^L have] *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: to surpass the limit of pure theoretical knowledge; [*irrtümlich nicht gestrichen*]: we have

^M cosmic] *korrigiert aus*: cosmical

^N It is not before we have attained] *über der Zeile hinzugefügt*, *Einfügeort markiert*

this^A ›conceptus cosmicus^B‹, this ›Weltbegriff der Philosophie‹[.] as it is called in German, that the field of Ethics becomes accessible to philosophical investigation and explanation. ›The mathematician[.] – says Kant – [.]the natural philosopher and the logician however successful the two former may have been in their advances in the field of rational knowledge and the two latter more especially in philosophical knowledge are merely artists of reason. There is besides a teacher in the ideal who sets them their tasks and employs them as instruments to further the essential ends of human reason. Him alone we must call philosopher but as he exists nowhere, while the idea of his legislation is to be found in that reason with which every human^C being is endowed, we shall keep entirely to the latter, determining more precisely what philosophy prescribes as regards systematic unity, in accordance with that cosmical concept from the standpoint of its essential ends.”⁷ The philosopher[.] in the highest and noblest sense of the word[.] cannot be conceived^D as a mere artist of reason, as a ›Vernunftkünstler‹; we must regard him and look upon him^E as a ›Lehrer im Ideal⁸ – an expression which, according to the laws of German language and German style[.] may be understood and interpreted in a twofold sense. It may mean that the philosopher is an ideal, a^F perfect teacher – or that he is a teacher of ideals, a teacher^G of the true and highest ends of mankind^H. But whatever interpretation we may prefer[.] we are led to the same result for^I our own critical analysis of Kant's ethical system^J. We cannot expound^K this system in its full extent, in all its applications and consequences, in the whole of its evolution and its ramifications[.] It is only the ideal scheme of the system,^L it is only the methodical out-

^A this| *korrigiert aus*: This

^B cosmicus| cosmiscus

^C knowledge and ... every human| *Ms.-S. 18 (Bl. 13v) ist, als Rückseite von Ms.-S. 17 (Bl. 13v), nur zur Hälfte beschrieben*

^D conceived| *danach gestrichen*: but

^E him| him,

^F a| *danach gestrichen*: most

^G a teacher| *über der Zeile*

^H mankind| *statt gestrichenem*: human kind

^I we are led to the same result for| *hinzugefügt auf rechtem Rand und unter der Zeile statt auf nachfolgender Ms.-S. 20 (Bl. 15) gestrichenem*: there follows and results [*irrtümlich nicht gestrichen*: for]

^J system| *danach gestrichen*: a clear determination and a clear restriction., of the the aims it may put to itself

^K expound| *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt*: expose

^L system,| *danach gestrichen*: as it was devised by Kant and as it was traced in a few firm traits,

line of Kant's moral philosophy which we^A mean to sketch. We^B have[,]
therefore^C, from the very beginning, to forego^D a description and a full^E
development of the scholastic concept of Kant's moral philosophy,^F but
we may endeavour to trace in a few lines [of] its cosmical concept – that
concept on which its systematical value and its historical influence^G is
based^H[,]. In order to determine this concept[,], we have, firstly, to treat the
theoretical foundations of K[ant]'s mor[al] phil[osophy].

2[.] / The theoretical foundations of Kant's Moral philosophy¹

In the exposition of the critical doctrine given by Kant himself one of the
best known and most obvious features consists in the discrimination and
accurate differentiation between the single faculties of reason. The uni-
versal nature of reason, its use and its limits[,], can never^I be understood
and explained but by a most precise distinction of its several powers. The
observance of the greatest carefulness in this regard is, according to Kant,
one of the most important conditions for the work of a critical philoso-
pher. The latter can never be too subtle and too^K scrupulous in the distinc-
tion of the single faculties of reason, of what is due to^L Sensibility, to the
faculty of judgment or understanding[,], to the faculty of ideas and so on.
Such a subtlety^M and punctiliousness may sometimes appear pedantic,^N
but[,], apart from this way[,], there is no hope whatever^O of attaining a clear
insight into the nature and articulation of reason. But in spite of the stress

^A we| *statt gestrichenem*: I

^B We| *statt gestrichenem*: Supposing we; Thus we

^C therefore| *über der Zeile*

^D forego| *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: renounce to give

^E full| ful

^F philosophy[,], philosophy;

^G influence| *danach Markierung*: //

^H that concept on which its systematical value and its historical influence is based|
that concept on which is based its systematical value and its historical influence;
danach nicht ganz verständliches Zeichen: ☐; *es folgt noch ein Satz auf dem unteren
Rand des Ms.-S. 20 und dann zwei leere Blätter*

¹ The theoretical foundations ... philosophy| *im Ms. als Titel unterstrichen*

^J can never| never can; *wird künftig stillschweigend korrigiert*

^K too| to

^L to| *danach gestrichen*: sense, to

^M subtlety| *korrigiert aus*: subtlen[ess]

^N pedantic[,], pedantic;

^O whatever| *evtl. besser*: whatsoever

which Kant is laying everywhere upon this problem of the division of the faculties of reason, we would be involved in a great and serious error in supposing that this methodological^A division implies and presupposes an essential, a metaphysical division. For in the essence of reason there is no real separation, no line of demarcation[,], which severs its different^B fields and domains from each other. Reason is One – and this Oneness, this essential unity[,], belongs to its very nature and is its peculiar privilege. In speaking of its different faculties and in analysing them must[,], therefore[,], be conscious that the^C discriminations we are searching for^D[,], and which are[,], indeed^E[,], of the highest importance[,], are to be understood not as substantial^F but as functional differences – as varieties^G of meaning, not as oppositions of nature. Reason is one and unique in its nature, but it is different and manifold in its actions and manifestations. Its articulation does not dissolve or annihilate this unity; on the contrary[,], it displays, explains and evolves this unity.^H There must, therefore, be a common basis and a common groundwork^I upon which are built^J all the different strata^K of the critical building. What is this common groundwork in regard to^L the theoretical and^M practical philosophy of Kant, and in what manner may it be defined? Supposing that theoretical and practical philosophy, that the Epistemology of Kant and his Ethics, are to be understood^N as essentially^O one and^P specifically different – where can

^A methodological] *korrigiert aus*: methodical; *über der Zeile*: olog

^B different] different

^C we must therefore be conscious that the] *rechts neben der ersten Zeile von Ms.-S. 23 (Bl. 20), unter der Seitenangabe 23: → folgt [Ms.-S.] 19!; nachfolgende zwei Blätter leer, dann wiederholt sich die Paginierung der Ms.-Seiten 19–23 (Bl. 23–27)*

^D we are searching for] which we are searching for

^E are indeed] indeed are

^F substantial] substantial,

^G varieties] *statt gestrichenem*: oppositions

^H unity.] *danach gestrichen*: When dealing with Kant's moral philosophy

^I groundwork] groundwork,

^J upon which are built] *auf nachfolgender Ms.-S. 19 unter der Seitenangabe in Bleistift*: (folgt auf [Ms.-S.] 23), *siehe edit.-philolog. Anm. C, Fortsetzung beginnt erneut mit*: upon which are built

^K strata] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: floors

^L in regard to] (in regard to); *schwach sichtbare Einklammerung in Bleistift unklar*

^M and] *danach eingeklammert und gestrichen*: the

^N understood] understood; *danach eingeklammert und gestrichen*: at the same time,

^O as essentially] *über der Zeile unleserliche, ausradierte Bemerkung in Bleistift*: simultaneous[...]

^P and] *danach eingeklammert und gestrichen*: as

we hope to find^A the origin of this identity and this diversity, how^B can^C we grasp^D that supreme link in^E the chain of Kant's critical deductions^F to which all the other links are attached and on which they depend^G? Or to speak in a less metaphorical, in a simpler and^H more strictly^I logical way: what is that concept of Kant's which is,^J in a certain sense, the highest and the most universal concept of the system – the concept which^K is the clue to the critical doctrine^L taken as a Whole^M – the keystone of the critical building?^N

There^O can be, in my opinion, but one concept that^P may claim^Q such a systematical importance – which may be considered^R the centre and^S the ideal focus of Kant's philosophy. All the different rays of^T Kantian Philosophy, from whichever point^U they may issue, are finally converging to a single, to one and the same point; all the thoughts of Kant about the nature and^V possibility of Metaphysics, about the origin and^W limits of human understanding, about the essence and^X determination of the will^Y are, as it were, condensed and concentrated in one principle Idea:^Z in

^A find] find out

^B how] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: where

^C can] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: may

^D grasp] *über der Zeile mit ? statt gestrichenem*: catch

^E in] of

^F deductions] deductions,

^G depend] are depending

^H simpler and] *über der Zeile statt über der Zeile gestrichenem*: more

^I more strictly] *in Bleistift über der Zeile*: more; *streng korrigiert in Bleistift aus*: strict

^J Kant's which is,] Kant's, which is

^K concept which] concept, which

^L doctrine] doctrine,

^M Whole] Whole,

^N ?] *in Bleistift*

^O There] *davor*: // *obwohl im Fließtext eingerückt*

^P concept that] concept, which

^Q claim] *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: to; *Streichung evtl. in Bleistift wieder aufgehoben*

^R considered] *danach gestrichen*: as

^S and] *danach gestrichen*: as

^T of] *danach unterstrichen und gestrichen*: the

^U from whichever point] from which point whatever; *gegenüber auf linker Seite (Rückseite von Ms.-S. 19) in Bleistift von fremder Hand*: 1. from whichever point / 2. from which point soever

^V and] *danach in Bleistift eingeklammert und gestrichen*: the

^W and] *danach in Bleistift eingeklammert und gestrichen*: the

^X and] *danach in Bleistift eingeklammert und gestrichen*: the

^Y will] *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: and about the moral destination of mankind

^Z Idea:] Idea,

the Idea of Freedom. ›Freedom‹ is the fundamental problem with which the whole critical philosophy is concerned^A, Freedom is the common theme which is developed and displayed in different variations in the [>]Crit[ique]^B of pure Reason[<], in the [>]Critique of practical reason[<] and in the [>]Critique of Judgement[<].^C

It^D may be objected to this view that neither in the [>]Critique of pure Reason[<] nor in the [>]Critique of Judgement[<] exists^E a full and explicit statement of the problem of freedom. In the former, it is true, Kant is entangled in the difficulties of the conflict^F between the concept of Freedom and the concept of Causality[, and in the chapter about the ›Autonomy of pure reason‹ he tries to solve these difficulties;^G he attempts to explain^H in what^I way the apparently^J opposite views^K of Freedom and Causality^L may be reconciled with each other^M. But in all these explanations Kant is concerned, as he himself^N emphasizes, not with the positive sense of the concept and the problem of freedom^O but only with its negative sense. It seems[, therefore[, paradoxical [–] and it may seem exaggerated [–] to consider the problem of Freedom not only as the centre of the ›Critique of practical reason‹ but as the centre and the kernel^P of the whole critical philosophy. Nevertheless[, this view is to be upheld – so far as we are considering^Q the thought of Kant not only with regard to its verbal^R expression^S but also with regard to its contents, to its philosophical

^A is concerned] *hierher verschoben von Position nach*: with which

^B is developed and displayed in different variations in the ›Critique] *zwischen den Zeilen hinzugefügt statt gestrichenem*: in the ›Critique

^C Judgement[<] *danach gestrichen*: is developing itself and displaying itself in different variations.

^D It] *davor Unterbrechungs- oder Absatzmarkierung am linken Rand*

^E exists] there is

^F conflict] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: opposition

^G difficulties;] difficulties,

^H explain] *danach gestrichen*: and to enlighten

^I what] which

^J apparently] *korrigiert aus*: apparent

^K opposite views] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: contradictions, arising from the opposition

^L Causality] Causality,

^M reconciled with each other] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: avoided

^N himself] *über der Zeile; nach*: emphasizes *gestrichen*: himself,

^O freedom] freedom,

^P kernel] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: focus

^Q considering] *danach gestrichen*: not only

^R verbal] *über der Zeile*

^S expression] expression, *danach gestrichen*: [eingeklammert: to] the terms, in which it is clothed,

meaning and its very origin. In this sense[,] we may say and we must say^A that the problem of Freedom is not only^B occasionally anticipated in the [>]Critique of pure reason[<], but that it pervades this [>]Critique[<]^C – that it is not only touched upon^D here and there, but that it is one of the^E guiding ideas^F by which the^G investigation, throughout the whole course of the [>]Critique of pure reason[<], has been influenced most deeply and^H decisively. To make this point clear, to show the importance of the concept and problem of Freedom, not only for Kant's ethical^I but also for his theoretical,^J logical and epistemological work, we must restrict ourselves^K here to the explanation and exposition of one single conception of Kant's^L philosophy: to the exposition of his^M idea^N of ›Spontaneity‹. ›Spontaneity‹ is the^O theoretical expression of that which^P is called ›Freedom‹ in the sphere of the practical, of moral philosophy: it is not only corresponding to it and, so to speak, its logical counterpart; but it is its necessary completion – a completion without which the full sense and the most profound meaning of the problem of Freedom cannot be explained^Q and cannot be grasped.

The ›Critique of pure reason‹ claims to be the arbiter in the great dispute, which[,] in the evolution^R of modern thought, had divided philosophy in two different camps^S and which had found its definite and^T most striking expression in the opposition of Leibniz to Locke. In Locke's ›Essay concerning human understanding‹ and in the critical examination of this [>]Essay[<] given by Leibniz in the ›Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement

^A say] say,

^B only] *danach gestrichen*: announced and

^C ›Critique[<] ›Critique‹,

^D upon] *über der Zeile, Einfügung in Bleistift mit Tinte überschrieben*

^E the] *danach gestrichen*: leading principles, of the [*über der Zeile gestrichen*: and]

^F ideas] ideas,

^G the] *danach gestrichen*: whole

^H and] *danach gestrichen*: has

^I ethical] ethical,

^J theoretical,] *danach gestrichen*: for [*eingeklammert*:] his

^K ourselves] *über der Zeile*

^L Kant's] *danach gestrichen*: theoretical

^M his] *überschrieben*

^N idea] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: nature

^O the] *danach gestrichen*: logical and

^P that which] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: what

^Q explained] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: exposed

^R evolution] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: development

^S camps] camps,

^T and] *danach als gestrichen eingeklammert*: its

humain<[, the ways of Empiricism and Rationalism were clearly defined and sharply distinguished. Philosophy has, as it seems,^A to make its choice between these two ways; it has to make up its mind^B whether it will take^C the one or the other. Every^D attempt to evade this decision by combining eclectically^{EF} the views^G of Empiricism and^H Rationalism seems hitherto to be impossible. For^I Empiricism and Rationalism[, as it has [been] clearly demonstrated by the example[s] of Locke and Leibniz^J], diverge^K from each other not only in the^L sense^M that they are of^N different opinions concerning^O the methods of understanding; they rather diverge^P on^Q the definition^R of the understanding itself^S, on^T its meaning and its purpose. They are not different ways^U which may finally^V guide us to the same goal^W; they are not only distinguished from each other in their views on^X the means of knowledge, but in their views on^Y the very end

^A , as it seems,] *über der Zeile; zuvor über der Zeile gestrichen*: hitherto

^B mind] *danach eingeklammert und gestrichen*: and to come to a decision,

^C take] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: go

^D Every] *statt gestrichenem*: For

^E eclectically] ecletically; *gegenüber auf linker Seite in Bleistift von fremder Hand*: eclectically (?); *Korrekturhinweis in Bleistift links neben der Zeile*: >

^F attempt to evade this decision by combining eclectically] *zwischen den Zeilen*

^G views] *unter der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: oppositions

^H and] *Lesung unsicher, weil überschrieben*

^I seems hitherto to be impossible. For] *zwischen den Zeilen statt gestrichenem*: never can be expected [*im Ms.*: expected] to be diminished and to [*eingeklammert*: be] reconciled [*im Ms.*: reconciled]

^J as it has been clearly demonstrated by the example of Locke and Leibniz] *zwischen den Zeilen*

^K diverge] *korrigiert aus*: are diverging

^L the] this

^M sense] sense,

^N of] *in Bleistift über der Zeile von fremder Hand; Korrekturhinweis links neben der Zeile*: >

^O concerning] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: about the sense and

^P rather diverge] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: are diverging; *im Ms. in Bleistift eingeklammert*: rather; *Korrekturhinweis links neben der Zeile*: >; *gegenüber auf linker Seite in Bleistift, von fremder Hand*: 1. even (?) / 2. indeed (?)

^Q on] in

^R definition] *statt gestrichenem*: way

^S itself] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: itself

^T on] of

^U ways] ways,; *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: means

^V may finally] finally may; *nach finally gestrichen*: may concern and

^W goal] *statt gestrichenem*: end

^X views on] view of

^Y views on] view of

of knowledge, of its sense and of its principal task^A. But the first step of the philosophy of Kant, of the critical philosophy[,] consists in denying the rightness^B and accuracy^C of this opposition. For the critical philosophy Experience and Reason, Sensibility and Understanding[,] are by no means opposed to each other or contradicting each other^D; they are, on the contrary, correlated to each other and supplement^E each other. The explanation and the exposition of this correlation, of the mutual connexion between^F the empirical and the rational conditions of knowledge, is the fundamental problem of the [.]Critique of pure reason[.]. The problem so often and so eagerly discussed by the interpreters and commentators of Kant, whether his philosophy follows^G the way of Leibniz or the way of Hume, the question, if, in^H the evolution^I of modern thought, his system is the continuation and achievement of^J the empirical or the rationalist tradition, is[,] therefore[,] after all^K an^L idle one^M. For the philosophical work of Kant doesn't consist in the fact^N that he has adopted and perfected^O any traditional, any previous view,^P but in the fact that he posits^Q a new question unknown hitherto in its very meaning and in its very terms. He doesn't divide the whole domain^R of knowledge in a merely quantitative way, he doesn't ask^S how great the share of the em-

^A task] *statt gestrichenem*: end

^B rightness] *korrigiert aus*: right

^C accuracy] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: the necessity

^D contradicting each other] *im Ms. in Bleistift eingeklammert; Korrekturhinweis links neben der Zeile: >; gegenüber auf linker Seite in Bleistift, von fremder Hand*: or, contradictory without "each other"

^E supplement] supplementing; *im Ms. in Bleistift eingeklammert über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: supplying; *Korrekturhinweis links neben der Zeile: >; gegenüber auf linker Seite in Bleistift, von fremder Hand*: better supplementary

^F between] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: of

^G follows] *korrigiert aus*: is following

^H if, in] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: whether [*im Ms.*: whethin]

^I evolution] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: development

^J is the continuation and achievement of] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: has continued and achieved

^K after all] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: at the bottom

^L an] *korrigiert aus*: a; *danach gestrichen*: meaningless and

^M one] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: question

^N fact] fact,

^O perfected] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: accomplished

^P view,] *evtl. besser*: view

^Q posits] puts

^R domain] *in Bleistift über der Zeile*

^S ask] ask,

pirical and of the rational factor^A is^B nor in what^C way these two factors are combined in order to make the product of knowledge. For Kant[,] knowledge and science don't arise from^D such an external combination of different things, which in their^E essence remain disparate and heterogeneous; they^F possess^G an internal, an original^H unity. Knowledge is not an aggregate^I but a system; it is formed not by mere addition^J but by an intimate connexion and, as it were, penetration^K of elements^L – by that sort of penetration called^M by Kant a ›Synthesis a priori^N. (This^O synthesis is^P, in the opinion of Kant, the universal and necessary condition of all knowledge; it is the condition of our logical and mathematical judgments as well^Q as of our empirical judgments; it is the general and common basis for our^R a priori and a posteriori-knowledge.)ST In order to constitute and to make possible the fact of Science, there is required not only a composition and a concurrence of^U empirical and^V rational factors – there must be a unification and, as it were, a consubstantiation of Reason and Experience. Experience is required and is indispensable for giving the ›matter‹ of Knowledge; Reason is constituting^W its ›form.‹ And ›matter‹ and ›form‹ are not to be regarded

^A factor] factor,

^B how great the share of the empirical and of the rational factor is] how great is the share of the empirical and of the rational factor

^C nor in what] and in which

^D don't arise from] *unter der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: are not

^E their] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: its

^F they] *danach gestrichen*: are, on the contrary, a sys[tem]

^G possess] *in Bleistift von fremder Hand über der Zeile in Wortmitte*: s *über*: possess

^H original] originally; originally *korrigiert aus*: originary

^I aggregate] aggregate,

^J addition] addition,

^K penetration] *davor gestrichen*: com[bination]

^L elements] elements,

^M called] which is called

^N a ›Synthesis a priori‹] *evtl. besser*: an ›a priori Synthesis‹

^O This] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: Without a

^P is] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: of this kind there can be

^Q well] *danach Komma gestrichen*

^R our] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: all

^S ⟨...⟩ *eckige Klammern in Bleistift*

^T a posteriori-knowledge.)] *nachfolgend fehlen im Ms. paginierte Ms.-Seiten 30–32, Fortsetzung der Ms.-S. 29 unmittelbar auf Ms.-S. 33 (Bl. 34)*

^U of] *danach gestrichen*: the

^V and] *danach gestrichen*: of the

^W is constituting] *im Ms. in Bleistift eingeklammert; Korrekturhinweis links neben der Zeile: >; gegenüber auf linker Seite in Bleistift, von fremder Hand*: Possibly: "Reason constitutes its ›form.‹"

as different things that^A need to be^B brought together by external forces; they are originally belonging^C to each other and adapted to^D each other^E in the way that^F the one cannot be conceived without and outside [of] the other.

By^G this conception of Kant's we may immediately understand the significance and the incomparable value attributed^H to the Spontaneity of^I understanding. (Abstracting from^J this spontaneity or denying it, we could never conceive the form of experience.^K)^L The spontaneous actions of the understanding, taken in their synthetic unity, are^M the necessary and indispensable conditions of Experience itself[,] and[,] therefore[,] the necessary conditions of all the objects of experience. No knowledge of any object whatever, no knowledge of objective value, can be attained but by this spontaneity of^N understanding. It follows from this view^O that even in the field of appearances, in the domain of the sensible world, the order and coherence of^P single appearances, the sort of ›necessity‹^Q by which we think them connected with each other, is by no means opposed to Spontaneity^R but is, on the contrary, based on it. Spontaneity is the condition without^S which the Necessity and the Causality of the physical world is not^T to be understood. ›The manifold of representations[<] – says

^A things that| things, which

^B be| *über der Zeile*

^C belonging| *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: correlated

^D to| *in Bleistift über der Zeile in fremder Hand statt gestrichenem*: for

^E and adapted to each other| *über der Zeile*

^F they are originally belonging to each other and adapted to each other in the way that| *Korrekturhinweis links neben der Zeile: >; gegenüber auf linker Seite in Bleistift, von fremder Hand*: Perhaps, either: "they belong originally| ... in such a way that ..." / or "they are to be regarded as originally belonging to ... in such way that ..."

^G By| *davor Absatz- oder Unterbrechungszeichen im Ms: ↵*

^H value attributed| value which is attributed

^I of| of the

^J Abstracting from| *evtl. besser*: In abstracting

^K experience.| *danach gestrichen*: and therefore the fact of experience, which is bound to its form and dependent on it.

^L (...) | *eckige Klammern in Bleistift*

^M are| *danach gestrichen*: by themselves

^N of| of the

^O view| view,

^P of| of the

^Q ›necessity‹| ›necessity‹,

^R Spontaneity| Spontaneity,

^S without| *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: under; [*über der Zeile gestrichen*]: except from

^T not| *danach gestrichen*: to be thought and

Kant in the “deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding” – [>] can be given in an intuition which is purely sensible, that is, nothing but receptivity ... But the conjunction (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and cannot, therefore, be already contained in the form of sensible intuition. For it is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation, and since this faculty, to distinguish it from sensibility, must be entitled understanding, all connexion – be we conscious of it or not, be it a connexion of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts – is an act of the understanding. To this act the general title ‘synthesis’ may be assigned, as indicating that we cannot represent to^A ourselves anything as connected in the object, which we have not ourselves previously connected, and that of all representations connexion is the only one which cannot be given through objects. Being an act of the self-activity, of the subject, it cannot be executed save by the subject itself.⁸ In this way[,] the critical analysis of Kant discovers and detects^B the activity and the spontaneity of the subject at the very root^C of our representation of an external, of an objective world. Whatever^D this world may be^E as a thing in itself,^F its representation and[,] therefore[,] its knowledge, depends on the synthetic unity of^G understanding and on^H its original and inalienable form. In this way[,] we have to conceive^I the strange and paradoxical words^J of Kant^K that the understanding is to be considered the “author of Nature”. It is its author, not regarding^L the matter of experience^M but regarding^N the form of experience: for the unity of the understanding is, as it were, the archetype and the pattern of all unity we may find in sensible appearances, in the kingdom of Nature. ([Kant, KrV, S.] A 125 ff[.])^O The

^A to] *über der Zeile*

^B discovers and detects] is discovering and detecting

^C root] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: bottom

^D Whatever] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: May; Be

^E may be] may be; *in Bleistift über der Zeile*

^F itself,] *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: whatever we choose;

^G of] of the

^H on] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: of

^I conceive] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: understand

^J words] word

^K Kant] Kant's

^L regarding] as regards; as regards: *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: concerning; *gegenüber am rechten Rand*: ?

^M experience] experience,

^N regarding] as regards

^O (A 125 ff.)] *unter der Zeile, Ort markiert, siehe Hrsg.-Anm. 10*

order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature,^A we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there. For this unity of nature has to be a necessary one, that is, has to be an a priori certain unity of the connection of appearances; and such synthetic unity could not be established a priori if there were not subjective grounds of such unity contained a priori in the original cognitive powers of our mind, and if these subjective conditions, in as much as they are the grounds of the possibility of knowing any object whatsoever in experience, were not at the same time objectively valid ... However exaggerated and absurd it may sound, to say that the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, and so of its formal unity, such an assertion is none the less correct, and is in keeping with the object, to which it refers, namely, experience. Certainly, empirical laws, as such, can never derive their origin from pure understanding ... But all empirical laws are only special determinations of the pure laws of understanding, under which, and according to the norm of which, they first become possible ... Pure understanding is thus in the categories the law of the synthetic unity of all appearances^B, and thereby first and originally makes experience, as regards its form, possible.^C₁₀

It^C is not possible, in^D the course of these lectures, to give a full account of this fundamental thought of Kant^E: to follow it in all^F its ramifications^G and in all its consequences. (For there is^H no single conception and no single^I doctrine of the [>]Critique of pure reason[<]^J which is not determined by this thought and, as it were, permeated by it.)^K We can't expose^L here this evolution of the concept of Spontaneity; we have to suppose it in order to be able to^M define the relation which, in the mind

^A nature,] *Hervorhebung durch Wellenlinie*

^B appearances] *statt gestrichenem*: exper[iences]

^C It] *danach gestrichen*: would

^D in] *evtl. besser*: over

^E Kant] Kant's

^F all] *über der Zeile*

^G ramifications] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: developments

^H is] *danach gestrichen*: no single page in the [>]Critique of pure reason[<] and

^I and no single] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: or

^J of the >Critique of pure reason<] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: contained in it

^K (...)] *eckige Klammern in Bleistift*

^L expose] *evtl. besser*: clarify; *gegenüber auf linker Seite in Bleistift Korrekturvorschlag von fremder Hand*: "Expose" (?): perhaps: elucidate, clarify, develop, explain, or: / "give an exposition of". / (Man wird einer Krankheit "exposed".)

^M to] *danach gestrichen*: understood and to

of Kant, connects^A the problem of knowledge and the problem of Ethics, the theoretical and the practical Reason. To act not by outward force^B, by the impulse of sensible impressions, but according to^C self-determination, according^D to a law contained in and founded on the spontaneity of our^E nature: that is^F[,] a quality common to^G pure will and^H pure understanding;^I it^J is the peculiar character, the privilege[,] of both of them. We may[,] therefore, from a merely logical point of view, be entitled to regard the pure understanding and the pure will as belonging to the same^K class,^L to consider both as special cases contained in the same^M logical genus and subordinated to it. But such a view, however correct in a merely logical sense, would not be sufficient for denoting^N and determining^O the profounder^P problem^Q of the relation between^R Will and Understanding. This problem is to be understood not only in a logical but also in a^S transcendental sense^T and in its transcendental importance. What is the specific difference – we have to ask ourselves –, what is the transcendental discrimination of the faculty of will and the faculty of understanding? Supposing^U that they are kindred in the sense that both are^V forms of spontaneity – what is the peculiar character^W which belongs to the spontaneity of the will and which[,] in a certain way^X[,] elevates it

^A connects] *statt gestrichenem*: consists

^B force] *danach gestrichen*: we

^C according to] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: by

^D according] *über der Zeile*

^E our] *statt gestrichenem*: the

^F is] *danach gestrichen*: the

^G a quality common to] *in Bleistift über in Bleistift gestrichener Korrekturzeile*: a property that of which partake; *diese hatte ursprünglich ersetzt*: the common trait of the

^H and] *korrigiert aus*: as; *danach gestrichen*: well as of the

^I understanding;] *darüber gestrichen*: have in common

^J it] and it

^K same] *danach gestrichen*: logical

^L class,] class;

^M same] *danach gestrichen*: common species

^N denoting] *statt gestrichenem*: designing

^O determining] *danach gestrichen*: the same profound unity and

^P profounder] more profound

^Q problem] *statt gestrichenem*: difference

^R between] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: of

^S a] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: its

^T sense] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: meaning

^U Supposing] *danach gestrichen*: and admitting

^V in the sense that both are] in that sense that both are; *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: as being different

^W character] character,

^X way] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: sense

above all the other powers of reason? Even common sense and common language seem to be aware of this difference;^A they seem to use^B the word ›Freedom‹^C in its full and proper^D sense, only for the domain of will and to^E confine^F it to this domain. What is the origin and what is the reason of this restriction^G which makes us speak^H in a special and prerogative sense of the Freedom of will^I instead of extending the term to the whole field of Reason in its theoretical and practical use?^J

Z

[2nd Lecture, 22/I/1934]

To^K answer this question, we must bear in mind^L that, in the theoretical and practical use of Reason, there is a difference arising not from the nature of Reason itself^M but from the nature of those^N objects to which it is applied and about which it is concerned.^O In the field of theoretical knowledge[,] which in the opinion of Kant is coextensive with the field of possible experience[,] the spontaneity of the understanding itself is

^A difference;] *danach gestrichen*: and

^B use] *danach gestrichen*: the full meaning of

^C ›Freedom‹] *danach gestrichen*: for the will,

^D proper] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: strict

^E to] *danach in Bleistift gestrichen und eingeklammert*: reserve and to

^F confine] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: restrict

^G restriction] restriction.; *danach gestrichen*: what is giving to the problem [unter problem gestrichen: name]; *Ersetzung unter der Zeile*: [in Bleistift gestrichen: by] which [in Bleistift gestrichen: we are giving; speaking] [*über der Zeile in Bleistift von fremder Hand*:] makes us speak

^H which makes us speak] *unter der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: , what is giving to the problem; *unter problem gestrichen*: name; *vor* which *unter der Zeile gestrichen*: by; make us speak: *in Bleistift, von fremder Hand, über gestrichenem ursprünglichen Ersatz*: we are giving speaking; *danach auf nachfolgender Ms.-S. 42a gestrichen, die Streichung auf Ms.-S. 41 fortführend*: [, what is giving to the problem] of freedom a [gestrichen: proper sense] deeper content and a prerogative meaning when [gestrichen: it is] we applied to the problem of will instead of being applied to the whole field of theoretical and practical knowledge? / the name of Freedom in a prerogative sense to the; *nachfolgend Ersatz auf selbiger Ms.-S. 42a*

^I will] will,

^J practical use?] *in Bleistift unter der Zeile*: [Monday] 15/I/1934] *und Unterbrechungsmarkierung*: ∟∟, *die gegenüber, auf der linken Ms.-Seite, in Bleistift wiederholt wird*: ∟

^K To] *im Ms. eingrückt*

^L mind] mind,

^M itself] itself;

^N those] *in Bleistift über der Zeile von fremder Hand*

^O concerned.] *danach gestrichen*: In the field of experience, which, indeed is co[extensive] as a matter of fact, is coextensive with the field of theoretical knowledge; *Pfeil in Bleistift weist von concerned. an Streichung vorbei zu letzten drei Worten auf der Ms.-S. 42 als Fortsetzung*: In the field