

Ernst Cassirer

Nachgelassene Manuskripte
und Texte

Band 16

Vorlesungen zu Hegels Philosophie der Moral,
des Staates und der Geschichte



Meiner

ERNST CASSIRER

NACHGELASSENE MANUSKRIPTE UND TEXTE

Herausgegeben von
Klaus Christian Köhnke
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und Oswald Schwemmer

Band 16

FELIX MEINER VERLAG
HAMBURG

ERNST CASSIRER

VORLESUNGEN
ZU HEGELS PHILOSOPHIE DER MORAL,
DES STAATES UND DER GESCHICHTE

Herausgegeben von
Christian Möckel

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Bibliographische Information der Deutschen Bibliothek

Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliographie; detaillierte bibliographische Daten sind im Internet über <<http://portal.dnb.de>> abrufbar.

ISBN 978-3-7873-1262-7

Zitiervorschlag: ECN 16

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VORWORT DES HERAUSGEBERS

Der vorliegende Band ist Ernst Cassirers nachgelassenen Texten zu Hegel gewidmet. Er präsentiert aus der Oxforder Zeit (1933–1935) den Text einer Vorlesung über die Moral- und Staatsphilosophie Hegels (1934), die in thematischem Zusammenhang sowohl mit Hegels Philosophie der Geschichte als auch mit der Moral- und Staatsphilosophie Kants steht. Ergänzt wird dieser Text durch eine Disposition der Oxforder Vorlesung, die als Beilage abgedruckt wird. Ebenfalls als Beilagen werden aus der Yaler Zeit Cassirers (1941–1944) zwei Mss. präsentiert, die vorbereitende Aufzeichnungen für zwei an der Yale University abgehaltene Hegel-Seminare (1941/42 und 1942/43) und einen Vortrag über Hegels Staatstheorie aus dem ersten der beiden Seminare enthalten. Das zweite Seminar nimmt umfangreich Bezug auf das Ms. der Oxforder Vorlesung.

Bei den Recherchen und Editionsarbeiten hat der Herausgeber umfangreiche Hilfe und Unterstützung erfahren. Besonderer Dank gilt der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, die die mehrjährige Forschungs- und Editionsarbeit zur Herstellung des Manuskriptes finanziell gefördert hat. Für die institutionelle Unterstützung dieser Ausgabe bin ich der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin zu Dank verpflichtet. Unverzichtbare Hilfe habe ich bei diesem Editionsprojekt von den Mitarbeitern der Universitätsbibliothek der HU, den Universitätsbibliotheken von FU, TU und UdK, der Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz Berlin, der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek München und der Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library der Yale University, New Haven (USA), insbesondere durch Frau Naomi Saito und Frau Karen Nangle, erfahren. Danken möchte ich ebenfalls Frau Dawn Doohar von der Oxford University Gazette und Fabien Capeillères (Caen/Princeton) für die Unterstützung meiner Recherchen. Oswald Schwemmer (Berlin) danke ich für die umsichtige, kollegiale Leitung und beständige Beförderung des Drittmittelprojektes ECN 16. John Michael Krois † (Berlin) war es leider nicht vergönnt, die Editionsarbeiten über ihren Beginn im Oktober 2009 hinaus interessiert zu verfolgen und mit Wort und Tat uneigennützig zu unterstützen. Paul Markus (Berlin) war mir als Studentische Hilfskraft ein unverzichtbarer Mitarbeiter bei der Transkription der Texte, dem mehrfachen Korrekturlesen der transkribierten Fassung und den umfangreichen Literaturrecherchen für den vorliegenden Band, ihm gebührt mein besonderer Dank. Für Hinweise und Hilfen dankt der Herausgeber außerdem: Jörn Bohr (Leipzig), Klaus Christian Köhnke (Leipzig), Axel Kopido (Hamburg) und Marcel Simon-Gadhof (Hamburg).

Christian Möckel

VORLESUNGEN ZU HEGEL

THE MORAL THEORY OF HEGEL^A₁

Hegel – [All Souls] Coll[ege]
Oxf[ord] [Trinity Term] 1934^B

[I.]

[23/IV/1934]

[1.] In the preface to his treatise on the fundamental principles of the Metaphysics^C of Morals Kant begins with the remark that ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three sciences: Physics, Ethics and Logic – a division which in his opinion was perfectly suitable to the nature of the thing, that is[,] to the essence of reason and to its systematic articulation.² The only improvement that can be made in this classic division of philosophy consists, therefore, accord[ing] to K[ant]^D not in any material change^E of its contents but in a formal and methodical alteration. Instead of merely enumerating the different parts of philosophy we have to look for a systematic principle from which this division follows and from which it necessarily results. In finding out this principle | we may both satisfy ourselves of the completeness of our division and also be able to determine correctly the necessary subdivisions. Kant regards therefore the traditional discrimination of several branches of philosophy, of which one is concerned with the problems of the physical world, the other with the problems of the understanding, the third with the problems of moral life –, not as a merely conventional and arbitrary one which is destined only for the use and purposes of the schools^F; he considers it, on the contrary, as a natural description and as an adequate expression of the object itself which Philosophy has in view. And according to this conviction he always lays stress upon the upholding and^G careful observation of

^A THE MORAL THEORY OF HEGEL] *innen im Kolumnentext wird die Paginierung Cassirers mitgeführt, ein senkrechter Strich im Text markiert den Seitenumbruch im Ms., siehe dazu auch vorliegende Ausgabe, S. 198*

^B Hegel ... 1934] *in Bleistift hinzugefügt auf Ms.-S. 1, oben rechts*

^C Metaphysics] Metaphysic

^D according to Kant] *in Bleistift über der Zeile hinzugefügt*

^E change] *ment gestrichen in: changement*

^F schools] *in Bleistift angefügt: s*

^G and] *danach gestrichen: the*

these natural boundaries of reason. | It is, as he says, not an enlargement of science, but a disfigurement of science to neglect and to efface these natural boundaries. Therefore the^A order in which Kant himself^B has^C expounded his philosophical thought, is by no means a merely subjective and fortuitous one – due to his special liking for artificial distinctions and for the^D symmetrical and architectonic form of his system. In adopting this order he thinks to explain and to elucidate the nature of reason itself. The line of demarcation which in the work of Kant divides and separates the whole of^E philosophy^F into^G different fields, into the domains^H of natural philosophy, of Logic and Ethics, has for Kant an objective sense and an objective truth.^I We cannot | pass from one field to another without changing, at the same time, the principles and the method of our investigation, without submitting ourselves to different and even opposed conditions of knowledge and scientific explanation. It is especially the field of Ethics, the field of practical reason which opens to^J us such a new kind and such a new method of philosophical investigation. For in crossing the threshold of Ethics we have to change all the concepts and all our former views based upon the conditions of natural science and of theoretical philosophy. Here we are not concerned with those laws which constitute and explain the order and connection of natural things and events, the order and connection of the phenomenal world. We have to face | a new object and a new problem; with the problem^K of freedom. Freedom would be nothing but a mere illusion, if all our knowledge was confined within^L the limits of experience, within^M the limits of the^N world of sense-appearances. In order to understand its

^A the| *danach gestrichen*: systematical

^B himself| *danach gestrichen*: has developed his thought and in which he

^C has| *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: explained and

^D the| *über der Zeile hinzugesetzt*

^E of| *in Bleistift im Ms. ausgestrichen*

^F philosophy| *in Bleistift verbessert aus*: philosophical problems

^G into| *in Bleistift verbessert aus*: in

^H into the domains| in the domain

^I an objective truth| *in Bleistift gegenüber auf linkem Rand, von fremder Hand*: ? actuality for truth

^J to| *über der Zeile hinzugesetzt, von fremder Hand*

^K with the problem| *in Bleistift über der Zeile hinzugesetzt statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: and we have to explain the possibility of the knowledge of such an object, the possibility

^L within| *in Bleistift, von fremder Hand, über der Zeile hinzugesetzt statt in Bleistift eingekreistem*: in

^M within| *in Bleistift, von fremder Hand, über der Zeile hinzugesetzt statt in Bleistift eingekreistem*: in

^N of the| *danach gestrichen*: sensible

meaning^A we have to transcend this world – we have to form the idea of an entirely different order of things, of a ›mundus intelligibilis‹,^B a world of pure noumena. Kant's^C philosophy erects a^D partition^E between these two orders of things and of philosophical problems which by no efforts of speculative thought is to be surmounted.^F We cannot reduce the form and the method of Ethics to the form of Logic or to the method of | natural philosophy – we cannot embrace in the same order of thought the questions concerning the objects and the possibility of experience and the questions arising from the idea of freedom and of moral obligation. Logic and natural philosophy on the one hand, Ethics on the other hand cannot be regarded as different links belonging as it were to one and the same chain of thought and of philosophical enquiry. The relation which undoubtedly exists^G between them and which constitutes and explains their systematical connexion is a relation not of homogeneous, but of heterogeneous things. Instead of reducing them to a common unity, it points out their essential difference, their constant opposition. This dualism of theoretical and practical reason, | of nature and freedom, of the world “des Seienden und des Sein-Sollenden”⁴ (of what is and what ought to be), is one of the presuppositions and of the principal foundations of Kant's philosophy. In acknowledging this dualism and in insisting upon it Kant, of course, does not mean to deny the unity of reason. Reason is one – but this oneness and identity of reason is to be understood^H as a synthetic, not as an analytic unity – as a unity which does not exclude the differences and^I oppositions of the single terms which are contained in it^J and comprehended by it. Critical philosophy cannot^K remove this opposition^L; it can only describe it and exhibit it as a fact. In

^A meaning| *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: (and in order to conceive its possibility); *runde Klammern in Bleistift*

^B ›mundus intelligibilis‹,| *danach gestrichen*: of

^C Kant's| Kants

^D a| *verbessert aus*: an

^E partition| *danach unleserliches Wort in Bleistift gestrichen*

^F surmounted.| *sur über der Zeile in Bleistift hinzugesetzt statt drei gestrichener Buchstaben; danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: over

^G exists| *verbessert aus*: [...]ists, *unsichere Lesung*, *evtl.*: subsists; *ursprünglich in Bleistift in Klammern gesetzt, gegenüber auf linker Seite in Bleistift ausradierter Korrekturvorschlag*: exists or [...] ?

^H understood| *danach gestrichen*: not

^I and| *danach in Bleistift unleserliches unterstrichenes Wort gestrichen*, *evtl.*: our; *gegenüber auf linker Seite in Bleistift*: ?

^J contained in it| *über der Zeile hinzugefügt statt gestrichenem*: combined

^K cannot| *danach gestrichen*: explain and it cannot

^L opposition| oppositions

this sense philosophy must content itself with defending the reality of | freedom and the reality of an ethical world without being able to explain or to conceive this reality. If reason seeks for such an explanation, if it endeavours to find out how freedom itself is possible, it quits the firm ground of philosophical enquiry. ›It is therefore‹ – as Kant emphasizes in the conclusion of his^A treatise on the fundamental principles of the Metaphysics^B of Morals – [>]no fault in the deduction of the supreme principle of morality, but an objection that should be made to human reason in general, that it cannot enable us to conceive the absolute necessity of an unconditional practical law ... It cannot be blamed for refusing to explain this necessity by a condition, that is to say, by means of some interest assumed as a basis, since the law would then cease to be a moral law, i[d] e[st] a supreme law of freedom. | And thus while we do not comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, we yet comprehend its incomprehensibility, and this is all that can be fairly demanded of a philosophy which strives to carry^C its principles up to the very limit of human reason.”⁵

2. In considering these words of Kant which, in a certain sense, contain the whole of his ethical doctrine and which express the ultimate goal and the definite result of this doctrine, we are immediately led to the radical and decisive difference between critical and absolute idealism, between the system of Kant and that^D of^E Hegel. It is a widely spread^F opinion which pervades and governs^G nearly all the descriptions of the history of modern philosophy, that Hegel's philosophy is, as it were, a direct descendent of the thought of | Kant;^H that it has brought the fundamental presuppositions and fundamental principles, which were already involved in the Kantian system, to an explicit statement and to their full development. According to this view, – which in recent Hegelian literature^I has been upheld for instance in the work of Richard Kroner “Von Kant zu Hegel” – the system of Hegel is the consummation and^J fulfillment of all those promises which were contained in Kant's original concep-

^A his| *evtl.*: this

^B Metaphysics| Metaphysic

^C carry| *unsichere Lesung; in Bleistift gegenüber auf linkem Rand von fremder Hand: ?*

^D and that| *über der Zeile in Bleistift eingefügt; gegenüber auf linker Seite ausradierter Korrekturvorschlag in Bleistift*

^E of| and

^F spread| *danach gestrichen:* and

^G governs| *in Bleistift:* s

^H Kant;| *danach gestrichen:* and

^I literature| *über der Zeile in Bleistift von fremder Hand:* literature

^J and| *danach gestrichen:* the

tion of his own doctrine but which he himself was unable to carry out.⁶ Hegel appears as that philosopher who has built^A upon the foundations laid down by Kantian philosophy and who first^B succeeded in giving not only an outline^C of the true system of idealism but in erecting it in its totality. Following^D | this opinion we had to consider the transition from Kant to Fichte, from Fichte to Schelling, from Schelling to Hegel as a continuous process of thought, as a slow and as it were placid development^E of a method of thinking which was already intended in the Critique of pure reason and in the Critique of practical reason. But without mentioning the very serious systematical objections which may be raised to such a view, we must insist upon the fact that, even from the standpoint of a merely historical consideration, it seems to be untenable. Recent investigations^F about the origin and growth of the Hegelian systems – investigations which are based upon the careful examinations of Hegel's manuscripts contained in the National Library of Berlin, – have led to the result that the | true sources of the system are not to be sought in any external influence made upon the mind of Hegel but that there is, from the very beginning of Hegel's earliest studies and earliest writings, a definite and original conception of his own which slowly ripens and grows to its maturity. It was not until these^G first manuscripts of Hegel were scrutinized and thoroughly explained and analyzed by Dilthey,⁸ and until they were published (1907)^H by Herman Nohl,⁹ a pupil of Dilthey's, that we were able to understand and to follow the development of Hegel's thought from its starting-point to that expression which it has^I found in the principal works of Hegel, in his Phenomenology of Mind, in his Logic, in his Encyclopaedia, in his Philosophy of Right. And in surveying all these different stages | of Hegel's philosophy we cannot but admire its perfect unity and its unbroken continuity. Hegel's systematic views may be liable to many difficulties and many objections; but even the most vehement adversaries and antagonists of his philosophy ought^J not to deny the intrinsic truth and the intrinsic worth of his system. It

^A built] *verbessert aus*: build

^B first] *verbessert aus*: firstly; *Streichung in Bleistift*

^C outline] *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: and grandplan

^D Following] *unsichere Lesung*

^E development] *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: of a purport and

^F investigations] investigation

^G these] *über der Zeile hinzugefügt statt gestrichenem*: this

^H (1907)] *unter der Zeile, unter*: published in *Bleistift hinzugefügt*

^I has] *über der Zeile in Bleistift hinzugefügt*

^J ought] *statt gestrichenem*: should

stands before us as a perfected^A work, as a thought which notwithstanding its^B complexity, its nearly infinite discriminations, is made and formed from the same mould. There is one conception and one conviction that pervades^C the whole work of Hegel – and we have to go back to this conception in order to be able to understand and to define the place which the problems of Ethics occupy in the Hegelian system. In comparing the contents^D and^E | systematical form of Hegel's Ethics with the contents and^F method of Kant's moral philosophy we are at once led to a fundamental difference. As we have pointed out^G Kant has finished his ethical enquiry by the explicit statement, that that idea, upon which the possibility of duty and of moral obligation depends,^H contains^I in itself^J a kind of incomprehensibility^K.¹⁰ Freedom must be acknowledged as a fact but^L this fact has to prove and to support itself, instead of being reducible to or deducible from any other notion or principle. But to admit a fact of this paradoxical kind, a fact which being incomprehensible in itself is none the less the ground^M and the basis of all rationality, would be, in the sense of Hegel, a contradiction in terms. For according to the first principle of his philosophy, which never has varied and which in the evolution of his thought never has undergone any change or modification, the difference between a world of facts on the one hand, and a world of reason, a world of ideas on the other hand is an arbitrary and superficial one. It is an idle and insufficient thought – a thought not aware of its own tasks and of its own original power – by which such differences are made and such separations are introduced.

Truth is not to be divided in two domains and provinces, in the field of a priori and a posteriori knowledge, in a world of mere facts and of pure forms. For there is no gap which separates the realm of reason from the realm of experience. Philosophical thought, in its true and in its highest

^A perfected| *über der Zeile in Bleistift statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: highly finished

^B its| *danach gestrichen*: infinite

^C pervades| *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: and governs

^D contents| *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: purport

^E and| *danach gestrichen*: the the; *letzteres* the *in Bleistift gesetzt und gestrichen*

^F and| *danach gestrichen*: the

^G pointed out| *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: before

^H depends,| *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: and upon which consequently the whole edifice of morality must be built,

^I contains| *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: is

^J itself| *danach gestrichen*: not

^K incomprehensibility| *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: – that; *nach Satzpunkt geändert*: freedom zu: Freedom

^L but| *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: that

^M ground| *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: work

sense, does not consist in the accommodation^A of facts to reason | or in the adaptation of reason to facts. It consists, on the contrary, in the insight that there is not only a^B conformity or a partial coincidence between reason and reality but that the very significance^C of^D rationality is contained and implied in the nature of reality and that the very^E meaning of reality is to be defined by rationality. The rational is the real, the real is the rational.¹¹ Hence to speak of the incomprehensibility of the idea of freedom is to deny its true reality, is to expel freedom from the world of men, of human experience and to locate it in a transcendent world, in a place inaccessible to^F human thought and human will. Ethical theory would lose^G its sense, its truth and its vigour by admitting such an artificial separation. For the worth | and the truth of such a theory cannot consist in the fact that it subjects the life of men, the reality of personal life and of history and politics, to arbitrarily thought out rules of conduct, to general and abstract principles of morality[.] All rules conceived in this way, all laws which instead of being^H derived from the reality of things,^I are enforced and imposed upon this reality^J, are mere phantoms;^K they are subjective thoughts and subjective demands which prove to be perfectly invalid^L when^M compared with the real standard of truth, with life and experience. If what we call^N practical reason were nothing else than such a vague ideal outside^O the empirical world^P it never could have any influence and any power over the real world of human history. This world obeys ethical laws and | yields to ethical scales because it is, in its proper essence, not only^Q mastered and subdued by reason, but^R penetrated and permeated

^A accommodation| accomodation

^B a| *danach gestrichen*: partial

^C significance| signifance

^D of| *danach gestrichen*: reality

^E very| *danach gestrichen*: sense

^F to| *danach gestrichen*: all

^G lose| *in Bleistift, von fremder Hand, über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem und eingeklammertem*: loose

^H instead of being| *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: are not

^I things,| *danach gestrichen*: but which

^J this reality| *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: it

^K phantoms;| *danach gestrichen*: which prove to be invalid, and to be perfectly powerless.

^L invalid| *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: powerless

^M when| *statt gestrichenem*: when

^N call| *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: understood by

^O outside| -side *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: -ward

^P world| *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: and excluded from it

^Q only| *danach gestrichen*: submitted

^R but| *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: as it were,

by reason.^A When Hegel, after a long interruption of his academical work, resumed^B his philosophical lectures in Heidelberg, he^C expressed this fundamental principle of his doctrine in the most pregnant and most striking way: “The courage of truth[,]” [–] he says – [“]the belief in the power of spirit is the first condition of philosophy. Man being spirit must esteem himself and ought to esteem himself worthy of the highest rank: he cannot esteem too highly the greatness and power of his spirit, and with this belief nothing will be so hard and unyielding as not to be open^D to him. The essence of the universe at first hidden and closed has no power^E by which it would be able to withstand^F | the courage of knowledge: it must become manifest, it must show its wealth and its depth and surrender them^G to the enjoyment^H of knowledge.[”]₁₂

From this essential character and from this first beginning of Hegel’s philosophy we may draw at once an important inference concerning the structure of his ethical theory. What strikes us first^I in comparing this theory with the doctrines of former philosophy, with the doctrines of Aristotle, of Spinoza, of Kant is the fact that in the whole extent^J of Hegel’s^K literary^L work no special work is destined for the treatment of the fundamental questions of morality. In order to find out and to determine the true sense of^M Hegel’s ethical doctrines we cannot refer to any single work, in which the totality of those doctrines is expounded and we cannot confine ourselves within the limits of such a work, of such a compendious summary of the prin|ciples of morality. Hegel^N planned in his youth a special treatise which^O bears the title “System der Sittlichkeit”₁₃; but even this treatise^P which remained an unpublished fragment, is far from dealing exclusively with the traditional views^Q of moral phi-

^A reason.] *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: “The courage of truth” – says Hegel

^B resumed] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: began at first

^C he] *danach in Bleistift eingekreist und in Bleistift gestrichen*: has

^D open] *korrigiert aus*: opening

^E power] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: force

^F withstand] *danach gestrichen*: to

^G surrender them] *statt gestrichenem*: give them

^H enjoyment] *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: delight

^I first] *korrigiert aus*: firstly

^J extent] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: work

^K Hegel’s] *danach gestrichen*: no special

^L literary] *in Bleistift, von fremder Hand, über der Zeile in Klammern*: literary

^M the true sense of] *über der Zeile hinzugefügt*

^N Hegel] *danach in Bleistift eingekreist und gestrichen*: has

^O which] *danach gestrichen*: he inscribed

^P but even this treatise] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: and

^Q views] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: and as it were conventional problems

lousophy, with those^A questions which are treated in the classical works^B of this philosophy. It is in^C this^D outline of his ethical teaching^E that we become first^F aware of the fact, that Hegel attempts to give to moral philosophy not only a new content^G, but a new significance and a new definition. What he calls by the term ›Sittlichkeit‹ – a term which scarcely is to be translated in a perfectly adequate^H word of the English language and which therefore by^I English translators has been circumscribed in different ways – some^J rendering^K it by phrases as Ethical world or Ethical^L | order, others^M coining the new term^N ›Ethicality‹ that means quite a different thing from what we are used to express^O by the name of morality and moral obligation. The first step of Hegel in the field of ethical investigation consists therefore in the enlargement of the whole domain of ethical problems and in an alteration^P of these^Q demarcations which in former philosophy were used in order to separate this field from other systematical disciplines^R, especially from the field of Logic. That classical division of philosophy in Physics, Ethics and Logic, to which Kant refers^S and in which he acquiesces, has therefore lost its sense for Hegel. He rejects all divisions^T of philosophy which are understood in a merely quantitative sense, which try to circumscribe and to determine the field and the contents of any | special philosophical discipline by distinguishing it from others and by excluding these others^U from its own sphere. Phi-

^A those| *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: that

^B works| *statt gestrichenem*: groundworks

^C It is in| *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: In

^D this| *danach gestrichen*: first

^E teaching| *danach gestrichen*: we are already

^F first| *über der Zeile hinzugefügt*

^G content| *korrigiert aus*: contents *durch in Bleistift eingekreistes*: s

^H adequate| *danach gestrichen*: english

^I by| *danach gestrichen*: the

^J some| *in Bleistift über der Zeile, von fremder Hand, statt eingeklammertem und unterstrichenem*: the one; *gegenüber auf linker Seite in Bleistift*: >

^K rendering| *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: using

^L or Ethical| *unter der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: coining it by circumscriptions as

^M others| *davor in Bleistift als Streichung eingekreist*: the

^N term| term of

^O express| *in Bleistift über der Zeile, statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: design

^P alteration| *in Bleistift über der Zeile, statt in Bleistift gestrichenem, unter die Zeile gesetzt*: the change; *letzteres statt ursprünglich gestrichenem*: an alteration

^Q of these| *unter der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: of the

^R disciplines| *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: investigations

^S refers| *verbessert aus*: referes

^T divisions| *in Bleistift über der Zeile, statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: partitions

^U others| other

losophy is not a mere sum, a collection^A of parts which may be combined by simple aggregation. It is dealing with truth – and, as Hegel points out in the preface of the ›Phenomenology of Spirit‹^J, Truth is the Whole and cannot be defined otherwise than by the idea of the Whole as a systematic all comprehensive unity.¹⁴ In this unity we^B cannot^C but in a merely arbitrary and conventional way, separate single parts and we cannot give them an independent meaning and an independent existence. The so called parts are not to be understood, in a^D quantitative sense, as mere scraps, as fragments of the whole; they are, on the contrary, provided that they have any philosophical significance and any [|] philosophical value, the Whole of Truth itself – taken in one of its essential moments and in a certain stage of its dialectical development. In the system of Hegel there can, therefore, be no separation and no critical limitation by^E which^F reason is divided in itself and by which it is distinguished into^G several provinces, in the field of theoretical or practical reason. Theoretical and practical reason, Logics and Ethics penetrate^H each other; and this very act of penetration of mutual determination, is that which^I we may call the reality, the realization of reason in its proper sense. From this it follows that in order to understand and to expound Hegel's ethical doctrines we are not allowed to treat them as a^J self-contained and self-sufficing whole. They are not^K to be derived^L from his ›Philosophy of Right‹ [|] or from^M his other writings concerning special legal, moral or political subjects; they must be explained and they must be constantly interpreted by reducing them to their systematical origin, by referring them to the Science of Logic, to the Encyclopedia and especially to the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel's ethical teaching is not – as in a certain sense it was in Aristotle or

^A collection] *unter der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: whole

^B we] *danach gestrichen*: can neither

^C cannot] *danach gestrichen*: distinguish single parts

^D in a] *danach gestrichen*: merely

^E by] *über der Zeile eingefügt*

^F which] *danach gestrichen*: practical

^G into] *in Bleistift korrigiert, von fremder Hand, aus*: in

^H penetrate] *in Bleistift über der Zeile hinzugefügt, von fremder Hand, statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: are penetrating

^I which] *in Bleistift über der Zeile hinzugefügt, von fremder Hand, statt in Bleistift gestrichenem und eingeklammerten*: what

^J a] *korrigiert, von fremder Hand, aus*: an

^K not] *über der Zeile eingefügt*

^L derived] *danach gestrichen*: and to not only

^M from] *in Bleistift über der Zeile hinzugefügt, von fremder Hand, statt in Bleistift gestrichenem und eingekreistem*: of

in Kant – a part or brand^A of his system – it is^B this system itself, it is a certain determinate aspect of it which nevertheless contains it as a Whole and claims to represent it in its totality.

3. But in admitting this view we encounter – with regard to our own investigation of Hegel's moral theory and with regard to our analysis of his^C ethical ideas – a very serious difficulty. Every attempt to | deal with the problems of this theory^D in the course of a few lectures seems henceforth to become impossible. We have to consider the system of Hegel in its totality, we have to follow the dialectic process in all its steps and in all its necessary moments – or we have to renounce once for all the real insight into^E the nature and structure of Hegel's philosophy^F. We are not^G allowed to cut out of this totality a special problem or even to leave out a single passage from the works of Hegel without being exposed^H to the reproach that by such an abridgement and such an extract of his thought we have deformed and mutilated its sense. But on the other hand in yielding to this methodical demand we are led to very strange and paradoxical conclusions. In order to illustrate the state of the problem | by a single instance I may mention that in recent German literature^I one of the most important and useful books that treats of^J the problems of Hegelian philosophy has been a book of Theodor Haering. It^K appeared in the year 1929 and it is entitled: Hegel. Sein Wollen und sein Werk. Eine chronologische Entwicklungsgeschichte der Gedanken und der Sprache Hegels. The author of this work proceeds from the principle that we cannot boast of having reached a real insight into^L the essence of Hegel's thought in its sources and in its historical and systematical evolution before having carefully scrutinized every word of his writings and before having interpreted every sentence in the right way. In the first volume

^A or brand| *über der Zeile eingefügt*

^B is| *danach gestrichen*: the determine

^C his| *danach gestrichen*: principal

^D deal with the problems of this theory| *in Bleistift auf Ms.-S. 25 oben rechts, neues Konvolut beginnend*: Hegel – Coll[ege] Oxf[ord] 1934 (bis [Ms.-S.] 64); *unleserlich*: 4

^E into| *in Bleistift korrigiert, von fremder Hand, aus*: in

^F philosophy| *danach gestrichen*: or of its

^G not| *danach gestrichen*: aut[horized]

^H exposed| *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: liable

^I literature| *korrigierendes x in Bleistift unter*: tt

^J of| *in Bleistift über der Zeile hinzugefügt*

^K It| *in Bleistift eingekreist und ausgestrichen*: has

^L into| *korrigiert, von fremder Hand, aus*: in

of his work, the only one which^A has appeared as yet, he is applying this maxim and this method of interpretation to the early manuscripts | of Hegel – first^B published by Nohl in the year 1907^C – under the title “Hegels theologische Jugendschriften”. He examines^D these manuscripts in their^E full extent; he follows their chronological order and he engages to give us a commentary not only of every concept or thought but also of every term^F occurring in the very rich and very complicated technical language of Hegel. The result of this method consists in the fact that in the work of Haering we have before us a big volume of about 800 pages, which nevertheless stops at the very moment in which Hegel’s system is on the point of emerging^G, of evolving from^H the raw material, from the bulk of historical, theological, philosophical knowledge hoarded up in the preliminary studies of Hegel. Haering^I cuts short his explanation^J and forsakes the reader | before Hegel has made his first step as a philosophical author, before the publication of his earliest works[.]^K The author has promised to give us a second volume^L, in which he intends to analyse^L in the same careful and detailed way the first systematical works of Hegel. But what appears to him to be the true method and the true ideal of interpretation is by no means confined within^M these limits. He does not avoid the conclusion and he does not shrink back from the demand that a really satisfactory commentary of Hegel’s works should easily fill a hundred^N volumes^O and therefore exceed the^P complete edition of these works by much more than the triple extent. But^Q is it^R not evident that such an ideal and such a demand is | in truth a self-contradictory task?

^A the only one which| *in Bleistift über der Zeile hinzugefügt statt in Bleistift gestrichenem*: which alone; *gegenüber auf linker Seite in Bleistift Hinweiszeichen*: >

^B first| *in Bleistift korrigiert aus*: firstly

^C 1907| *in Bleistift*

^D examines| *über der Zeile hinzugefügt statt gestrichenem*: considers

^E their| *über der Zeile hinzugefügt statt gestrichenem*: its

^F term| *danach gestrichen*: , of every new technical expression

^G emerging| *in Bleistift über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: appearing

^H from| *statt gestrichenem*: out of

^I Haering| *danach gestrichen*: explanation

^J his explanation| *in Bleistift unter der Zeile mit Hinweisfeil hinzugefügt*

^K works.| *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: , especially before the publication of his ›Phenomenology of Spirit‹

^L analyse| *danach gestrichen*: and to interpret

^M within| *statt gestrichenem*: in

^N hundred| *danach gestrichen*: of

^O volumes| *danach schwach zu erkennende eckige Klammer ausradiert*

^P the| *danach gestrichen*: former

^Q But| *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: it

^R it| *in Bleistift über der Zeile eingefügt*

Even when succeeding in this immense task we could by no means be sure of having reached our essential, our philosophical end. For the extent and the copiousness and completeness of a commentary is not to be used as the real standard of philosophical insight. It may perhaps be said that by such a copious and detailed account of every Hegelian thought and every Hegelian word we had attained no other goal than^A that which is described by Hegel himself in his term^B ›bad infinity‹^C. He always points out and emphasizes that true completeness and true perfection does not consist in the^D quantitative comprehension,^E in the exhaustive treatment of a subject which goes through all its single parts. This perfection is^F | to be understood in a quite different sense, – it involves^G a qualitative meaning^H which^I cannot be defined by the mere^J categories of number and measure. And in this sense we may say that the perfect insight into^K the nature and^L truth of a philosophical system is quite independent of that discursive view which we attain in passing through its single parts and in explaining its single presuppositions and problems. If the system is a real whole – in the sense^M which Hegel gives to the notion of the whole – it must have a kind of omnipresence; it must be present and it must be recognizable in every constituent part, in every moment really belonging to itself. In this sense and under this presupposition alone we are entitled to treat here^N the problems of Hegel's ethical theory. By such a treatment we don't^O attempt to abstract these problems and as it were | to tear them^P off from the rest of the system; we attempt, on the contrary, to condense the system, to concentrate it in one of its moments and to explain it by^Q this particular aspect.

^A than] then

^B term] term of

^C ›bad infinity‹] *in Bleistift über der Zeile hinzugesetzt*: schlechte Unendlichkeit

^D the] *über der Zeile hinzugefügt und gestrichen*: merely

^E comprehension,] *danach gestrichen*: and quantitative

^F is] *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: on the contrary

^G involves] *über der Zeile*

^H meaning] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: sense; *nach*: meaning *in Bleistift wieder gestrichen*: and a qualitative value

^I which] *über der Zeile statt gestrichenem*: which

^J mere] *über der Zeile*

^K into] *in Bleistift korrigiert, von fremder Hand, aus*: in

^L and] *danach in Bleistift gestrichen*: in the

^M sense] *danach gestrichen*: of

^N here] *in Bleistift über der Zeile hinzugefügt*

^O don't] dont

^P them] *über der Zeile hinzugefügt*

^Q by] *danach gestrichen*: from