

Nam-In Lee

Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity

Husserl, Levinas, and
East-West Dialogue

Nam-In Lee
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Introduction

1. Husserl's Phenomenology as the Starting Point for the Exploration of Intersubjectivity

This book is the fruit of twenty years of research into intersubjectivity. It consists of eleven chapters. There is a unity among them, even though they were not originally conceived as book chapters. What they address are the following four themes that are closely related to one another: 1) the discovery of some new aspects of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity; 2) a defense of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity against the criticisms of scholars who hold illegitimate views of it; 3) the promotion of a dialogue between phenomenologists/philosophers on the topic of intersubjectivity; and 4) the exploration of some new horizons of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Let me briefly clarify each of these four themes.

First, Husserl stands at the center of my research on intersubjectivity. Unfortunately, Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity has often been misinterpreted. There are even scholars who consider Husserl's phenomenology to be a kind of egology or Cartesianism that cannot adequately address intersubjectivity as a topic for phenomenology. However, this interpretation takes only a small part of Husserl's phenomenology into account since, as I will show, Husserl developed various kinds of phenomenology of intersubjectivity that go far beyond the scope of egology or Cartesianism. I clarify Husserl's distinctions among the various kinds of phenomenology of intersubjectivity such as the empirical, ontological, transcendental, and metaphysical phenomenology of intersubjectivity, each of which has its own sub-disciplines. I clarify this point in chapter 2 on "Static-Phenomenological and Genetic-Phenomenological Concepts of Primordiality in Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation", chapter 3 on "Various Fields of the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity and the Relationship between Husserl and Buber", chapter 4 on "Genetic Phenomenology and Problems of Intersubjectivity", and in chapter 5 on "Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity in Husserl and Levinas".

Second, by clarifying the various fields of Husserl's phenomenology, we can see that most of the criticisms of his phenomenology of intersubjectivity are invalid. It is true that among the various fields of his phenomenology of intersubjectivity, the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity seems closest to the kind of Cartesianism that Husserl's critics have in mind. In particular, critics often point to the phenomenology of intersubjectivity developed in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation as proof that Husserl's phenomenology is intrinsically Cartesian. However, such criticisms overlook two crucial points. In the first place, despite all appearances, the basic idea behind the static phenomenolo-

gy of intersubjectivity is not as Cartesian as critics suspect. And in the second place, critics do not take into account the other fields of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity that Husserl developed, fields that radically depart from Cartesianism.

Third, my primary aim in assessing the criticisms made of Husserl's phenomenology is not simply to vindicate Husserl against all other philosophers or to assert his superiority dogmatically, but rather to promote a phenomenological dialogue from which both sides can profit. We find that contrary to critics' opinions, these very critics have more in common with Husserl than they may suspect. Besides, even those who wish to disagree with Husserl must have a solid grasp of what exactly they are disagreeing with in the first place. Only through such constructive criticism can there be a fruitful dialogue that is free from artificial disagreements or misunderstandings. To this end, I attempt to promote a phenomenological dialogue between Husserl and other philosophers. In particular, Part II focuses on evaluating Levinas's criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity; there are also discussions of other philosophers such as Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred Schutz, Martin Buber, and Jürgen Habermas in Part I. In addition, in Part III I attempt to promote a phenomenological dialogue between Western philosophers such as Husserl, Max Scheler, and Francis Hutcheson and Eastern philosophers such as Confucius, Mencius, and Chong Yak-Yong.

Fourth, I attempt to explore some new horizons for the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. For example, in chapter 8 on "Phenomenology of Exteriory beyond Linguistic Idealism", I show that Levinas's philosophy contains remnants of linguistic idealism and I attempt to develop a genetic phenomenology of exteriory that is free from any linguistic idealism. Finally, in the three chapters of Part III, I attempt to develop the moral phenomenology of intersubjectivity by considering such themes as the phenomenology of ethical renewal, the phenomenology of moral feeling, and the phenomenology of moral instinct in such a way as to open up a new dialogue between Western and Eastern philosophy.

On the whole, then, this book discusses various kinds of the phenomenology/philosophy of intersubjectivity developed by many philosophers, including Husserl and other post-Husserlian phenomenologists such as Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, and Alfred Schutz; some contemporary philosophers such as Martin Buber and Jürgen Habermas; a traditional Western philosopher, Francis Hutcheson; and some East Asian philosophers, including Confucius, Mencius, and Chong Yak-Yong. Due to the constraints of space, not all of their accounts of the phenomenology/philosophy of intersubjectivity are discussed at length, nor are they necessarily addressed in a systematic way. Nevertheless, I hope the book provides a broad overview of various approaches to the phenomenology of intersubjectiv-

ity, thereby giving readers an opportunity not only to experience their diversity, but to grasp their points of unity.

2. *Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity in Husserl*

There are scholars who claim that Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity is either insufficient or even an outright failure. Such criticisms are often based on works that Husserl published during his lifetime, such as *Cartesian Meditations* or *Formal and Transcendental Logic*.¹ However, if we take a closer look at the phenomenology of intersubjectivity developed in these works, we can see that the usual criticism of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity is illegitimate. Moreover, it is astonishing to see how Husserl attempts to carry out many different kinds of phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity in other works and manuscripts in a way that goes far beyond the scope of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity developed in the *Cartesian Meditations* or *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Husserl not only discusses many more topics of intersubjectivity, but in some cases does so in a much more detailed manner than any other phenomenologist or philosopher,² a fact that is often overlooked by scholars who claim that Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity is a failure or is simply insufficient. However, there are also some important studies that do reveal the sheer diversity of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity³ and show how criticisms of Husserl are often based on only

¹ Hua XVII; Edmund Husserl: *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Translated from German by Dorion Cairns. The Hague 1969.

² In this respect, I entirely agree with Dan Zahavi, who writes as follows: "From the winter 1910/11 and until his death, he worked thoroughly with different aspects of the problem of intersubjectivity, and left behind an almost inestimable amount of analyses, that from a purely quantitative point of view by far exceeds the treatment given this topic by any of the later phenomenologists" (Dan Zahavi: "Husserl's intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy". In: *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 27(3), 1996, 228–245, here: 228).

³ For example, Klaus Held: "Das Problem der Intersubjektivität und die Idee einer phänomenologischen Transzendentalphilosophie". In: Ulrich Claesges, Klaus Held (Eds.), *Perspektiven transzental-phänomenologischer Forschung. Für Ludwig Landgrebe zum 70. Geburtstag*. Den Haag 1972, 3–60; Ichiro Yamaguchi: *Passive Synthesis and Intersubjektivität bei Edmund Husserl*. Den Haag 1982; James Mensch: *Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Idealism*. Albany, NY 1988; Georg Römpf: *Husserls Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität und ihre Bedeutung für eine Theorie intersubjektiver Objektivität und die Konzeption einer phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Dordrecht 1992; James G. Hart: *The Person and the Common Life: Studies in a Husserlian Social Ethics*. Dordrecht 1992; Kathleen M. Haney: *Intersubjectivity Revisited: Phenomenology and the Other*. Athens, OH 1994; Julia V. Iribarne: *Husserls Theorie der Intersubjektivität*. München 1994; Anthony J. Steinbock: *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl*. Evanston, IL 1995; Natalie Depraz: *Transcendance et incarnation: Le statut de l'intersubjectivité comme alterité à soi chez Husserl*. Paris 1995; Dan Zahavi: *Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität. Eine Antwort auf die sprachpragmatische Kritik*. Dordrecht 1996; Janet Donohoe: *Husserl on Ethics and Intersubjectivity: From Static to Genetic Phenomenology*. Amherst, NY 2004; Lanei M. Rode-

a few of his works. I myself have also published studies in a similar vein, but by adopting my own strategy of distinguishing between various fields of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in order to display the diversity of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity. My studies have been guided, first of all, by the more specific distinction between the static and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity as two kinds of the constitutive phenomenology of intersubjectivity. It has also been guided by the more general distinction between 1) the empirical phenomenology of intersubjectivity, 2) the ontological phenomenology of intersubjectivity as an eidetic or essential science serving as the foundation of the empirical phenomenology of intersubjectivity, 3) the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity, which is the foundation of both the empirical and the ontological phenomenology of intersubjectivity, and 4) the metaphysical phenomenology of intersubjectivity. I have collected some of these studies in Part I.

In chapter 1, I clarify the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology to lay the foundations for discussing Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity. The distinction between them is an important yet controversial issue in Husserl's phenomenology and plays a central role in this book. Husserl seems to have been aware of this distinction before 1910; however, it was only after 1920 that he attempted to clarify the distinction systematically. There are many manuscripts that deal with this distinction, and given such an abundance of sources, one might have the impression that the distinction is already clear enough. Unfortunately, this distinction is not as obvious as it seems, even to Husserl himself, who wrestled with the question in the early 1920s. Since he was not clear about the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology, he repeatedly attempted to clarify it, but if we take a close look at the various writings where he discusses the distinction, we realize that the way he discusses it is not at all consistent. Moreover, there are many different views of Husserl's distinction between static and genetic phenomenology.

If we take a look at the manuscripts and works dealing with the distinction, we find that Husserl makes this distinction in two different ways. On the one hand, in some manuscripts from the beginning of the 1920s, Husserl argues that static phenomenology serves as a pre-stage of genetic phenomenology, and

meyer: *Intersubjective Temporality: It's About Time*. Dordrecht 2006; Søren Overgaard: *Wittgenstein and Other Minds: Rethinking Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity with Wittgenstein, Levinas, and Husserl*. New York 2007; Michael D. Barber: *The Intentional Spectrum and Intersubjectivity: Phenomenology and the Pittsburgh Neo-Hegelians*. Athens, OH 2011; Christel Fricke, Dagfinn Føllesdal (Eds.): *Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl*. Berlin 2013; Peter R. Costello: *Layers in Husserl's Phenomenology: On Meaning and Intersubjectivity*. Toronto 2012; Eric Chelstrom: *Social Phenomenology: Husserl, Intersubjectivity, and Collective Intentionality*. Lanham, MD 2013; Frode Kjosavik, Christian Beyer, Christel Fricke (Eds.): *Husserl's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity: Historical Interpretations and Contemporary Applications*. New York 2019.

he calls it a “phenomenology of leading clues”⁴ that “makes it possible”⁵ to carry out genetic analysis. According to him, static phenomenology analyzes “finished” (*fertig*)⁶ constitution or apperception, whereas the genesis or the history of the finished constitution is the topic of genetic phenomenology. If we make the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology in this way, the former can be absorbed into the latter and lose its identity as an independent constitutive phenomenology as will be clarified in a detailed manner in chapter 1. On the other hand, in some other manuscripts after 1929 Husserl attempts to clarify the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology differently. According to this new distinction, the aim of static phenomenology is to clarify the transtemporal or atemporal “validity-foundation” (*Geltungsfundierung*)⁷ of constitution, whereas the aim of genetic phenomenology is to clarify the temporal genetic foundation (*Genesisfundierung*) of constitution. The transtemporal validity-foundation and the temporal genetic foundation are basically different, and thus static and genetic phenomenology turn out to be two different kinds of constitutive phenomenology—Husserl even speaks of the “double face of phenomenology”⁸ in this regard. I claim that the second distinction is legitimate, and I attempt to show why. In my view, the distinction between static phenomenology as a phenomenology of transtemporal validity-foundation and genetic phenomenology as a phenomenology of temporal genetic foundation will not only help us to better understand Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity, but also to clarify the relationship between Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity and those of subsequent phenomenologists/philosophers.

In chapter 2 on “Static-Phenomenological and Genetic-Phenomenological Concepts of Primordiality in Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation”, on the basis of the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology discussed in chapter 1 I clarify the ambiguity of the concept of primordiality in Husserl’s phenomenology. According to Husserl, the primordial sphere is the foundation or the motivational ground for the experience of the other, and as such it is introduced in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation as a fundamental concept without which it is not possible to develop the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Although the concept of primordiality obviously plays a central role in the development of the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, it has undergone many interpretations and critical assessments and there are many different views of it. Among the interpreters who are very critical of it, some hold the extreme view that it

⁴ Hua XIV, 41; Edmund Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*. Translated from German by Anthony J. Steinbock. Dordrecht 2001, 644.

⁵ Hua XXXV, 408.

⁶ Hua XI, 345; Husserl: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, 634.

⁷ Hua XV, 613 ff.

⁸ Hua XV, 617.

is impossible to conceive such a primordial sphere, since it cannot be observed phenomenologically. On the contrary, some interpreters hold the view that it is indeed a legitimate concept that is indispensable for developing a transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Unfortunately, these interpreters do not agree as to the context in which the concept of primordiality is introduced in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation.

Many of Husserl's interpreters implicitly assume that there is only a single concept of primordiality in Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation, namely the concept presented in §44 and subsequent sections. Contrary to what they believe, in chapter 2 I show that there are two concepts of primordiality in Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation, namely the static-phenomenological concept and the genetic-phenomenological concept of primordiality, and I clarify this point through three steps.

First, clarifying the concept of primordiality discussed in §44 and subsequent sections in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, I show that it is possible to carry out the primordial reduction as a kind of thematic epochē and to reach the primordial sphere. Since Husserl writes that the primordial reduction is carried out “inside the universal transcendental sphere”,⁹ in order to understand the possibility of carrying it out, we need to grasp the structure of the “universal transcendental sphere”. This is the sphere that is opened through the transcendental reduction as “the universal transcendental reduction”,¹⁰ which is possible through the transcendental epochē of the general thesis of the natural attitude. The universal transcendental sphere consists of the sphere of my own transcendental subjectivity and the sphere of the other transcendental subjectivities. Given that from the methodological perspective, the universal transcendental sphere is divided into the sphere of my own transcendental subjectivity that I can experience through “transcendental reflection”,¹¹ and that of the other transcendental subjectivities that I can get access through transcendental empathy, which Husserl calls “phenomenological empathy”,¹² it is possible to abstract from either one of these two spheres depending on one's research interest. The primordial reduction discussed in §44 and subsequent sections in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation is nothing other than the procedure of abstracting from the sphere of the other transcendental subjectivities and focusing on the sphere of my own transcendental subjectivity.

⁹ Hua I, 124; Edmund Husserl: *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*. Translated from German by Dorion Cairns. The Hague 1960, 93.

¹⁰ Hua XV, 536.

¹¹ Hua I, 72; Husserl: *Cartesian Meditations*, 33.

¹² Hua XIII, 172; Edmund Husserl: *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910–1911*. Translated from German by Ingo Farin, James G. Hart. Dordrecht 2006, 67.

After showing how it is possible to carry out the primordial reduction as a kind of thematic epochē and to reach the primordial sphere, I show that this concept of primordiality is the static phenomenological one and clarify its structure. I show that the static primordial sphere has the following traits: 1) From the perspective of myself as the one empathizing, the static primordial sphere consists of my intentionalities and the world and worldly objects experienced by them; 2) The static primordial sphere is a realm for which I as an autonomous and responsible person can take responsibility; 3) For this reason, in order to reach the static primordial sphere, I need what Husserl calls “a unique sort of philosophical solitude which is the fundamental methodical requirement for a truly radical philosophy”¹³ and, in this sense and only in this sense, the static primordial sphere can be called a realm that is free of others; 4) From the perspective of the static primordial sphere I have an absolute priority over others since I can always experience my own transcendental subjectivity with a higher degree of validity than others; 5) The static primordial sphere does not contain non-objectifying acts that are not founded on objectifying acts, but only objectifying acts and non-objectifying acts that are founded on objectifying acts since only these acts are bearers of validity which falls under the province of static phenomenology.

Afterwards, by consulting some other passages in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation and other works by Husserl, I clarify the genetic phenomenological concept of primordiality and show that we can make a distinction between the four kinds of the genetic primordial spheres such as 1) the natural pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere, 2) the natural ideal primordial sphere, 3) the transcendental pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere, and 4) the transcendental ideal genetic primordial sphere which have four corresponding kinds of geneses of empathy such as 1) the natural pre-ideal genesis of empathy, 2) the natural ideal genesis of empathy, 3) the transcendental pre-ideal genesis of empathy, and 4) the transcendental ideal genesis of empathy. Moreover, I show that the genetic primordial sphere has a different structure than the static one and possesses the following traits: 1) The genetic primordial sphere is a realm in which I and others dwell together; 2) In the genetic primordial sphere, I do not have a priority over others, since I am dependent on them; 3) The genetic primordial sphere is a unity of development and has various levels; 4) The genetic primordial sphere contains not only objectifying acts and non-objectifying acts that are founded on objectifying acts, but also non-objectifying acts that are not founded on objectifying acts since these too are incessantly operating in the field of consciousness as the genetic foundation of empathy.

¹³ Hua VI, 187–188; Edmund Husserl: *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*. Translated from German by David Carr. Evanston, IL 1970, 184.

In chapter 3 on “Various Fields of the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity and the Relationship between Husserl and Buber” I make a distinction between the various fields of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in Husserl and clarify the relationship between Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity and Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue by assessing Michael Theunissen’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity from the standpoint of Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue. According to Theunissen, Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity cannot avoid solipsism, since it is confined to analyzing the transcendental subjectivity which he considers a solitary ego devoid of sociality. Thus, Theunissen implicitly assumes that Husserl developed only one kind of phenomenology of intersubjectivity that is solipsistic. Moreover, he claims that Husserl’s phenomenology cannot deal with the issue of the different kinds of Thou that he considers are unique to Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue.

In order to assess Theunissen’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity, I clarify the distinction amongst the different fields of phenomenology of intersubjectivity developed by Husserl such as 1) the ontological phenomenology of intersubjectivity, 2) the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity, and 3) the metaphysical phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Moreover, in relation to the distinction between the static-phenomenological concept and the genetic-phenomenological concept of primordiality discussed in chapter 2, I attempt to clarify in a detailed manner the distinction between the two kinds of the constitutive phenomenology of intersubjectivity, namely the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity as a phenomenology of the validity-foundation concerning intersubjectivity and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity as a phenomenology of the genetic foundation concerning intersubjectivity. The distinction between them is crucial to understanding Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity as well as the relationship between it and other types of phenomenology/philosophy of intersubjectivity developed by other subsequent philosophers.

After clarifying the distinction between the different kinds of phenomenology of intersubjectivity in Husserl, I assess Theunissen’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity. My main argument is twofold: First, Theunissen’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology as solipsism overlooks the distinction between the static and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. It is true that, as Husserl himself admits, the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity as a phenomenology of the validity-foundation has “the illusion of solipsism”,¹⁴ but it has nothing to do with solipsism. Moreover, in the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity it is impossible to even have the impression of solipsism, since the genetic primordial sphere is always already intersub-

¹⁴ Hua I, 176; Husserl: *Cartesian Meditations*, 150, translation altered.

jectively structured and the genesis of empathy cannot be performed without intersubjective connections with others. Second, if we take a close look at the various fields of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity developed by Husserl, we observe that the different kinds of the *Thou* that Theunissen considers to be unique to Buber's philosophy of dialogue are also discussed by Husserl and that, contrary to what Theunissen claims, Husserl's phenomenology is not diametrically opposed to Buber's philosophy of dialogue.

In chapter 4 on "Genetic Phenomenology and Problems of Intersubjectivity" I explore the different fields of the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity that go beyond the scope of the issues discussed in chapters 2 and 3. If we take a look at Husserl's works on intersubjectivity, we realize that he discusses various issues pertaining to genetic phenomenology. However, Husserl's reflections on the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity are scattered throughout his works and manuscripts, and he did not integrate them all into a single, comprehensive exposition. I will accordingly address some of the important passages dealing with the issue of the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity in order to sketch out the various fields of a genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity developed by Husserl. The genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity encompasses a wide array of problems, and it is impossible to cover all of them extensively within the limits of chapter 4. There are various ways to address them corresponding to the interests of researchers and I examine those issues that are most relevant to our purposes: 1) some further issues concerning the experience of the other that are not discussed in detail or not discussed at all in chapter 3, for example the issue of non-objectifying intentionality as the genetic foundation of the experience of the other, that of the social experience of the other or that of the historical experience of the other, 2) the genesis of the habitual system of the experience of the other, and 3) the constitution of society.

After I attempt to give a unified account of Husserl's genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, I clarify the relationship between Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity and the various kinds of phenomenology/philosophy of intersubjectivity developed by Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred Schutz, and Jürgen Habermas. In my discussion of this relationship, I focus first of all on Husserl's genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, but also take into account the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity discussed in chapters 2 and 3. The correct understanding of the relationship between them is an aim that should be pursued for its own sake, but it has the additional merit of making it possible to better understand both Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity and the subsequent work on this theme by others.

Clarifying the relationship between Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity and the various kinds of the phenomenology/philosophy of intersubjectivity developed by philosophers after him, I refute some of the criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity that are related to the genetic

phenomenology of intersubjectivity. As mentioned above, after the publication of the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity was criticized by many scholars. The critics of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity are, first of all, phenomenologists after Husserl such as Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Alfred Schutz, etc., but there are also some critics who are not classified as phenomenologists—for example Michael Theunissen, as discussed above, or Jürgen Habermas. Of course, with some other phenomenologists such as Max Scheler or Maurice Merleau-Ponty it is not entirely clear if they are criticizing Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity, but there are certainly some scholars who claim that this is the case. Based on the account of the various fields of Husserl's genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, I show how these criticisms are ultimately invalid.

For many of the critics of Husserl's phenomenology, their criticism of his phenomenology of intersubjectivity functions as a springboard from which they can develop their own philosophical positions. This is the reason why many of them would consider their philosophical positions to be superior to Husserl's account, and indeed, to go far beyond the scope of Husserl's phenomenology. But if their criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity are problematic, we have to ask whether they have really developed philosophical positions that go beyond Husserl's phenomenology. In this respect, I show that Husserl has actually paved the way to the various philosophical positions they have developed and that there are similarities between Husserl's positions and their own positions. For this reason, we need to promote a dialogue between Husserl and his critics, a dialogue from which both Husserl and his critics can profit.

3. Husserl and the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity in Levinas

The phenomenology of intersubjectivity is an important topic not only for Husserl, but also—as we have already seen above—for phenomenologists who followed after him. As discussed above, it is important for the future development of phenomenology to properly clarify the relationship between Husserl and subsequent phenomenologists in regard to the issue of intersubjectivity. Among the various kinds of phenomenology of intersubjectivity, Levinas's phenomenology of intersubjectivity has interested me the most. Part II contains studies that I have published or presented with the aim of clarifying the relationship between the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in Husserl and in Levinas. In developing his phenomenology of the face in his major work *Totality and Infinity*,¹⁵ Levinas offers various kinds of criticisms of Husserl's phe-

¹⁵ Emmanuel Levinas: *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. Translated from French by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh 1969.

nomenology. The most important aims of Part II are to clarify that Levinas's criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology are not legitimate and to demonstrate the possibility of promoting a dialogue between Husserl and Levinas. There are in fact many important studies that not only attempt to clarify the relationship between Husserl and Levinas, but agree with my view. For example, with respect to the relationship between the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in Husserl and in Levinas, Søren Overgaard claims that "As far as intersubjectivity is concerned, Husserl and Levinas are mainly phenomenological allies, not opponents."¹⁶

Chapter 5 on the "Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity in Husserl and Levinas" seeks to clarify the relationship between the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in Husserl and in Levinas by assessing Levinas's criticism of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity. As implied by the title of *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas's phenomenology of the other states that the various kinds of relations between the ego and the other can be observed from the planes of *totality* and of *infinity*. The plane of totality consists of relations between the ego and the other in a relative sense since the other is totalized by the ego, and as such cannot be called the other in an absolute sense. In contrast, the plane of infinity consists of relations between the ego and the other in an absolute sense since the other resists all attempts by the ego to totalize and reabsorb the other into itself. The planes of totality and infinity can themselves be further divided into various smaller planes that must be distinguished from one another. For example, the plane of totality can be divided into the plane of representation, the plane of *Zeug*, the plane of enjoyment, etc. Likewise, the plane of infinity can also be divided into various sub-planes such as the plane of the face, the plane of eros, the plane of fecundity, etc.

Levinas criticizes Husserl's phenomenology by claiming that as a phenomenology of representation, it is the most radical form of the philosophy of totality and is therefore blind to the plane of infinity. In contrast, Levinas believes his own phenomenology opens up the possibility of developing a phenomenology of intersubjectivity on the plane of infinity. Since Levinas believes that the rela-

¹⁶ Søren Overgaard: "On Levinas' critique of Husserl". In: Dan Zahavi et al. (Eds.), *Metaphysics, Facticity, Interpretation: Phenomenology in the Nordic Countries*. Dordrecht 2003, 115–138, here: 116. Other studies that are in agreement with my view include the following: Depraz: *Transcendance et incarnation*; Jeffrey Powell: "Levinas representing Husserl on representation". In: *Philosophy Today* 39(2), 1995, 185–197; John E. Drabinski: "The hither-side of the living-present in Levinas and Husserl". In: *Philosophy Today* 40(1), 1996, 142–150; Yasuhiro Murakami: *Lévinas phénoménologue*. Grenoble 2002; Curtis Hutt: "Identity, alterity, and ethics in the work of Husserl and his religious students: Stein and Levinas". In: *Philosophy Today* 53(1), 2009, 12–33; Thomas Finegan: "Levinas's faithfulness to Husserl, phenomenology, and God". In: *Religious Studies* 48(3), 2012, 281–303; Stacy Bautista: "The development of Levinas's philosophy of sensibility". In: *Philosophy Today* 57(3), 2013, 251–265; Hagi Kenaan: "Husserl and Levinas: The ethical structure of a philosophical debt". In: *The European Legacy* 21(5–6), 2016, 481–492.

tions between the ego and the other on the plane of totality are fundamentally different from those on the plane of infinity, he argues that his own phenomenology of intersubjectivity cannot be reconciled with Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity.

However, Levinas's criticism of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity relies on the implicit premise that Husserl developed only one kind of phenomenology of intersubjectivity, when in fact Husserl developed several kinds. Thus, I reevaluate Levinas's criticism of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity by referring to the various fields of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity that I clarified in chapter 3 on "Various Fields of the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity and the Relationship between Husserl and Buber". More specifically, I use the distinction between the ontological and the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity to show how Levinas's criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity fall short. First, by comparing Husserl's ontological phenomenology of intersubjectivity and Levinas's phenomenology of the other I show that Husserl's ontological phenomenology of intersubjectivity is not simply a phenomenology of representation as Levinas had supposed but includes the phenomenology of infinity in the Levinasian sense as one of its fields. Second, by comparing Husserl's transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity and Levinas's phenomenology of the other I show how Husserl's phenomenology does not totalize and absorb the other into the same ego, since the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity is completely neutral regarding the question of whether the intersubjective relation is a representational one. Chapter 5 is not simply about vindicating Husserl against Levinas or correcting Levinas's views, but rather is meant to show that the gap between the two thinkers is not as wide as Levinas had supposed. Thus chapter 5 opens up a new dialogue between the two philosophical positions on intersubjectivity, a dialogue from which both can profit. The other chapters in part II are, in one way or another, supplements to chapter 5, providing a more detailed understanding of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in Husserl as well as in Levinas.

Chapter 6, on "Phenomenology of Sensible Life in Husserl and Levinas", attempts to clarify the relationship between Husserl's genetic phenomenology and Levinas's phenomenology of the face by clarifying the relationship between the phenomenology of sensible life in Husserl and in Levinas. Some commentators on Levinas's phenomenology hold the view that the phenomenological movement from Husserl to Heidegger, then from Heidegger to Levinas, can be described as a process of unidirectional development. According to this widespread view, the limitations of Husserl's phenomenology were overcome by Heidegger's phenomenology which in turn was surpassed by Levinas's phenomenology of the face. This view originally does not stem from commentators, but from Levinas himself, as is evident in some of his major works such as *Totality*

and *Infinity* and *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*.¹⁷ In chapter 6 I attempt to show that Husserl's phenomenology is not merely a preliminary stage or constituent moment of Levinas's phenomenology of the face and that Husserl's phenomenology cannot be integrated into that of Levinas. I demonstrate this through an analysis of the intentionality of sensible life, a theme that plays an important role both in Husserl's genetic phenomenology and in Levinas's phenomenology of the face. First, I delineate some aspects of the phenomenology of sensible life that Levinas develops as a part of the phenomenology of the face as well as some aspects of the phenomenology of sensible life that Husserl develops as a part of genetic phenomenology, and I demonstrate that Husserl's phenomenology cannot be defined as a phenomenology of representation as Levinas had thought. Thereafter I compare Husserl's genetic phenomenology and Levinas's phenomenology of the face, showing that they represent two basically different kinds of phenomenology that cannot be integrated at all.

Chapter 7 on "Experience and Evidence" assesses Levinas's criticism of Husserl's concepts of evidence, a criticism that can be found in his major work, *Totality and Infinity*. (As is well known, experience and evidence are two enormous topics in phenomenology. In this chapter, I limit my discussion of these topics to the aspects most relevant for the task of assessing Levinas's criticism of Husserl's concept of evidence.) After I summarize Levinas's criticism of Husserl's concept of evidence, I outline Husserl's concept of experience and attempt to define Husserl's concept of evidence with respect to his concept of experience. Next, I assess Levinas's criticism of Husserl's concept of evidence and show that this criticism misses the mark since it is based on a complete misunderstanding of Husserl's concept of evidence. Finally, I show that it is only on the basis of the evidence of absolute experience that Levinas can clarify the structure of absolute experience as the experience of the other in an absolute sense and can develop a phenomenology of the face on this basis. Even though Levinas does not discuss the issue of the evidence of absolute experience in detail, it is nevertheless the case that from a methodological point of view, he must appeal to it in developing a phenomenology of the face.

Chapter 8, on "Phenomenology of Exteriory beyond Linguistic Idealism", aims to develop a genetic-phenomenological concept of exteriory by evaluating and refining Levinas's concept of exteriory. First, I clarify what linguistic idealism is and show how Levinas's concept of exteriory displays traces of it. Linguistic idealism is the philosophical position that considers language to be a necessary condition for the constitution of the world and of worldly objects. But such a position cannot address either the pre-linguistic or the trans-linguistic level of entities, and since Levinas's philosophy contains remnants of lin-

¹⁷ Emmanuel Levinas: *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*. Translated from French by Alphonso Lingis. The Hague 1981.

guistic idealism, it, too, suffers from these flaws. Then I discuss three possible relationships between the world and worldly objects in genetic-phenomenological constitution and thereby clarify the genetic-phenomenological concept of exteriority, namely something that can cause a radical change from one form of the world into another. Next, I analyze the genetic-phenomenological event—the radical change from one form of the world into another—and clarify the structure of this event by comparing it to the event in Heidegger's later philosophy and in Levinas's phenomenology of the face. Finally, I examine some views that are critical of linguistic idealism, such as Meister Eckhart's view that God is ineffable; the Buddhist view that ultimate reality is ineffable; and the Taoist view that "The Tao that can be spoken of is not the eternal Tao". This opens the possibility of carrying out a phenomenological dialogue between East and West by moving beyond linguistic idealism which is precisely what the genetic-phenomenological concept of exteriority allows us to do.

4. Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity and the Dialogue between East and West

Phenomenology of intersubjectivity is an important topic not only in Western philosophy but in Eastern philosophy as well. For example, intersubjectivity plays a crucial role in the moral philosophy of Confucianism. The four cardinal virtues of Confucianism—benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom—are virtues that acquire their meaning through intersubjective relations between persons. We can accordingly employ the phenomenological reduction in order to analyze the four cardinal virtues of Confucianism under the lens of the moral phenomenology of intersubjectivity. In part III I compare Husserl, Scheler, and Hutcheson to Eastern philosophers such as Confucius, Mencius, and Chong Yak-Yong. Through this comparison, we can realize that there is a great deal of affinity between the Western and Eastern traditions, thereby opening up the possibility of a new dialogue between the two. In so doing, we can discover new horizons in the phenomenology of intersubjectivity.

Chapter 9, on "Ethics of Renewal in Husserl and Confucius", opens a dialogue between Husserl and Confucius on the topic of ethical renewal. In the 1920s, Husserl developed an ethics of renewal and wrote five articles on the topic. A closer examination of these articles from the 1920s reveals that the ethics of renewal was an important topic for his later phenomenology. It is exciting to note that 2400 years before Husserl developed his ethics of renewal, Confucius (孔子, 551–479 BC), the founder of Confucianism, had already discussed important issues regarding the ethics of renewal in his *Analects* and *The Great Learning*. In chapter 9, I tried to reconstruct and evaluate the ethics of renewal in both Husserl and Confucius before clarifying the intersubjective aspect of

ethical renewal. Finally, I sketch out the future tasks of an ethics of renewal. Chapter 9 is the first study to date that explores the relationship between Husserl and Confucius, demonstrating the possibility of interpreting Confucius as a phenomenologist in his own right. By setting up a new and fruitful dialogue between these two otherwise seemingly disparate thinkers, chapter 9 also promises to open up a new dialogue between Eastern and Western philosophy.

In chapter 10 on “Feeling as the Origin of Value in Scheler and Mencius”, I compare the views of Max Scheler (1874–1928) and Mencius (孟子, 372–289 BC) on the relationship between feeling and value. There have been many attempts to develop the theory of value in the history of philosophy, as well as in contemporary philosophy. Broadly speaking, there seem to be three major positions, namely axiological rationalism, axiological sentimentalism, and axiological conativism. These positions consider reason, feeling, and desire (conatus) respectively to be the origin of value. Max Scheler, one of the most important phenomenologists of the 20th century, and Mencius, one of the founding fathers of Confucianism, both take feeling to be the origin of value and can therefore be considered the proponents of axiological sentimentalism. In fact, despite the great spatial and temporal distance between them, there are striking similarities between the theories of value they developed. It should be noted, however, that there are also some differences between them that largely stem from some of the difficulties that arise within their theories of value. These difficulties should be removed so that a better theory of value can be developed. In chapter 10 I have tried to promote a phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius that could lead to such a better theory. I first summarize their theories of value and feeling and show that both theories have certain limitations that could be overcome by combining elements of the two theories together. Furthermore, by analyzing the four moral feelings discussed by Mencius—“the heart of compassion”, “the heart of shame”, “the heart of courtesy and modesty”, and “the heart of right and wrong”—I underline the intersubjective aspect of moral feeling so that we can understand the structure of moral feeling more concretely.

Finally, in chapter 11, on “Moral Instinct in Hutcheson and Chong Yak-Yong”, I attempt to develop a phenomenology of moral instinct. There are several philosophers who have developed a theory of moral instinct, and in chapter 11 I will be concerned with two of them, Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) and Chong Yak-Yong (1762–1836), examining their possible contributions toward a phenomenology of moral instinct. Francis Hutcheson is a Scottish philosopher who is well known for his moral philosophy as a theory of moral sense, and he developed a theory of moral instinct as a part of this theory. Chong Yak-Yong, better known by his pen name Dasan, is the most important representative of *silhak*, a practical stream of Confucianism in the 18th and 19th centuries of the Choson Dynasty in Korea; he developed a theory of moral instinct within the general framework of his theory of human nature. It is highly interesting to

observe that the theories of moral instinct developed by Hutcheson and Chong Yak-Yong display various kinds of similarity, and by partly adopting and partly criticizing their theories, we can develop a phenomenology of moral instinct. First, however, I must clarify the concept of instinct since it plays an important role in chapter 11 but is widely misunderstood. Then I introduce the theory of moral instinct that each thinker developed since both philosophers have contributed immensely to the clarification of moral instinct. Yet this does not mean that they have provided perfect theories in no need of revision. In fact, each theory has some limitations that must be overcome in order to develop a phenomenology of moral instinct. I will address one of the topics they discuss—namely, the relationship between moral instinct and moral feeling—and show how we can develop a phenomenology of moral instinct by partly adopting and partly criticizing their views on this topic. Moreover, there are many important topics in the phenomenology of moral instinct that they have not clarified systematically. Among these topics, I focus on that of the intersubjective aspects of moral instinct and attempt to clarify some of these aspects as a way of developing a phenomenology of moral instinct.

PART I
Problems of Intersubjectivity in Husserl